Proposing a Transactional Approach to Civil Forfeiture Reform by van den Berg, Michael
  
  
(867) 
COMMENT 
PROPOSING A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH TO  
CIVIL FORFEITURE REFORM  
MICHAEL VAN DEN BERG† 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 868 
I. THE HISTORY OF CIVIL FORFEITURE ....................................... 872 
A. The Ancient Roots of the Practice ...................................................873 
B Uses Throughout American History ............................................... 874 
C. The Drug War and the Expansion of Forfeiture ............................... 875 
II. FORFEITURE LAW TODAY ......................................................... 878 
A. The National Landscape ............................................................. 878 
1. Federal Law ....................................................................... 878 
a. CAFRA ....................................................................... 878 
b. Customs Rules and Other Federal Laws ............................ 879 
2. State Law .......................................................................... 880 
a. North Carolina ............................................................. 880 
b. Alaska .......................................................................... 881 
c. Florida ......................................................................... 882 
3. The Interrelation: Equitable Sharing .................................. 883 
B. Arguments for Robust Civil Forfeiture Laws ................................... 885 
 
† Senior Editor, Volume 163, University of Pennsylvania Law Review. J.D. Candidate, 2015, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2012, Rollins College.  
I am grateful to Professor Louis Rulli for his advice on this Comment. I would like to thank 
Michael McDonald, Florentina Dragulescu, Sara Arrow, and all of the Associate Editors of the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review for their helpful edits on this Comment. I am indebted to 
Sarah Stillman for writing the incredible New Yorker article that inspired this Comment. I am also 
grateful to my Comments Editor, Stephanie Moran, for her constant guidance, aid, and patience. I 
would like to thank my dear parents and five siblings, without whom I would not be here. I feel a 
strange sort of indebtedness to LUDA, and most especially to Alex Meier, for their support 
throughout the process. And finally, to Sopen Shah, thank you for your patience and guidance in 
finalizing and perfecting this piece.  
  
868 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 867 
 
III. REFINING THE ISSUE ................................................................ 887 
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS ........................................................... 890 
A. Inaction .................................................................................... 890 
B. Expanding Constitutional Defenses ............................................... 893 
1. Double Jeopardy ................................................................ 894 
2. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and  
Fourteenth Amendments ................................................... 897 
3. Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment .............. 902 
C. Removing the Profit Motive from Civil Forfeiture ........................... 906 
D. Abolishing Civil Forfeiture ............................................................ 910 
V. THE TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH ............................................. 913 
A. Some Insights from Economic Theory ............................................. 913 
1. Transaction Costs ............................................................... 913 
2. Externalities ...................................................................... 916 
3. Nudges ............................................................................... 918 
B. Proposed Solutions ...................................................................... 919 
1. Require an Immediate in Personam Hearing to Determine 
Whether the Seizure is Justified ......................................... 919 
2. Require Forfeiture Documentation to be Notarized by 
Independent Notaries ........................................................ 920 
3. Require Extensive Documentation on Any Dogs Used in 
Forfeiture Actions .............................................................. 920 
4. Disallow the “Alert” of Drugs on Currency to  
Justify Forfeiture ................................................................ 921 
5. Require One Hundred Percent of Attorneys’ Fees to Be 
Returned to Successful Claimants ...................................... 922 
6. Require Officers Who Would Engage in Seizure to Obtain 
Certification ...................................................................... 922 
C. Progress? ................................................................................... 923 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................925 
INTRODUCTION 
Civil forfeiture is a truly extraordinary legal doctrine—so much so that 
those who find themselves subject to a forfeiture proceeding frequently 
express disbelief that such an action could exist in the United States.1 The 
Kafkaesque civil forfeiture system is ancient, labyrinthine, and impermeable 
to the uninitiated. Despite its esoteric nature, federal, state, and local 
 
1 See infra note 290 and accompanying text.  
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authorities commonly utilize this legal doctrine. While the practice once 
had reputable roots, it has become a tool with enormous potential for abuse. 
This Comment explores the doctrine of civil forfeiture at a macro level 
before suggesting some specific recommendations for reform.  
I begin by briefly examining the history of civil forfeiture. Forfeiture has 
its origins in biblical text and was present in English law as early as the 
tenth century. Rapidly appearing via statute in the United States, it was 
used as a tool against smugglers, confederate sympathizers, and liquor 
runners during Prohibition. The practice grew increasingly common in the 
1980s, as legislatures realized forfeiture could prove a potent weapon in the 
war on drugs. As such, forfeiture use has since expanded dramatically; 
today, the value of property forfeited annually stands in the billions of 
dollars.2  
The historical underpinnings of civil forfeiture continue to be relevant 
because they help clarify what forfeiture is. Essentially, forfeiture is an 
action filed directly against property, rather than against an individual. It 
depends on the central notion that property can be guilty per se. Forfeiture 
actions, then, proceed against the property itself. The property owner, who 
is reduced to a third party claimant, lacks many constitutional protections 
that would otherwise be available in a criminal action.3  
Nationwide, civil forfeiture laws are a complex, multilayered landscape 
of federal and state statutes. The federal forfeiture statute—the Civil Asset 
Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA)4—stands as the dominant federal para-
digm, although it interacts with other federal laws, like customs statutes, 
that provide for forfeiture. Simultaneously, forty-nine states—all except 
North Carolina—allow civil forfeiture. Law enforcement officers pursuing a 
seizure of property have a number of options; for instance, federal “equitable 
sharing” guidelines allow officers in a state with a more restrictive statute to 
bypass state guidelines and access more favorable federal forfeiture proceedings.  
Critically, many of these statutes—most notably CAFRA—allow law 
enforcement to keep the proceeds of forfeiture actions. Although the 
revenue raised by forfeiture has proved vital to reinforcing sagging law 
enforcement budgets in difficult economic times, such provisions also 
increase the threat of abuse. The resulting revenue, combined with a lower 
burden of proof than in criminal prosecutions, incentivizes law enforcement 
 
2 See infra note 32 and accompanying text (citing several articles that detail the high aggre-
gate value of the property seized). 
3 See infra note 140-141 and accompanying text (noting that double jeopardy applies to people 
but not property).  
4
 Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000). 
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to use civil forfeiture as a tool to seize and dispose off individual property 
for its own ends. 
This Comment addresses the problems associated with civil forfeiture in 
a very specific context: mid value chattel (MVC) and low value chattel 
(LVC) forfeiture. This should not suggest that forfeiture against real 
property (RP) or high value chattel (HVC), defined here as chattel with a 
value greater than $10,000, is not problematic. Rather, MVC and LVC 
forfeiture pose several unique problems.  
The major issue that MVC and LVC seizure creates is that it is simply 
not economically rational for most individuals to defend an action against 
such chattel, given the relatively high cost of doing so. Standard attorneys’ 
retainers in forfeiture actions can be upwards of $10,000—an amount that 
may be several times greater than the value of the chattel itself.5 Indeed, 
data reveal that approximately eighty percent of forfeitures are uncontested.6 
Moreover, it is not readily apparent that the seizure of MVC and LVC—
often involving small, personal belongings, such as phones or sneakers—is 
particularly effective at stopping pernicious drug traffickers. Finally, the 
Constitution, which provides some due process protections for the depriva-
tion of real property via forfeiture, does not afford analogous protection to 
MVC and LVC. 
Many other proposed solutions to the problems of civil forfeiture fall 
short of providing a framework to protect MVC and LVC. First, law 
enforcement officers, prosecutors, and their lobbies oppose any limitation on 
forfeiture. Second, some legal commentators have argued for extending 
constitutional protections to forfeiture. MVC and LVC, however, pose 
unique problems for any ex post constitutional protections. The major 
problem, of course, is that the majority of such actions are uncontested. As 
such, courts simply do not consider any constitutional protections because it 
is not economically rational for individuals to litigate a defense in the first 
place. 
Even if the advanced constitutional protections of the Fifth or Eighth 
Amendments merited consideration, they would fail to provide much help to 
MVC and LVC claimants. For example, although the Eighth Amendment’s 
excessive fines clause can overturn certain forfeitures, which in the language 
 
5 See infra note 112 and accompanying text (referencing a forfeiture case involving property of 
very low monetary value).  
6 See infra note 106 and accompanying text (providing uncontested rates for forfeiture cases 
generally and for drug cases specifically).  
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of CAFRA are “grossly disproportional,”7 MVC and LVC are frequently of 
such little value that this provision does not provide sufficient protection. 
The most serious suggestion—and one not disparaged here—is the 
abolition of the profit motive in forfeiture. This Comment, however, 
cautions against viewing such an approach as a panacea that would cure all 
the ills of forfeiture. First, there is evidence that forfeiture can be a tool of 
racial oppression.8 Merely abolishing monetary profit from forfeiture might not 
therefore dissuade officers from engaging in forfeiture to harass minorities.9 
Furthermore, abolishing the profit motive might discourage officers from 
undertaking the forfeitures that “matter”—i.e., pursuing valuable proceeds 
or instrumentalities of the drug trade, such as the massive property owned 
by Pablo Escobar, seized in Florida during the 1980s.10 Forfeitures of such 
properties are likely to be complicated and dangerous, and police should be 
rewarded for pursuing them. Finally, totally stripping the profit system 
from forfeiture might cripple police budgets, which, particularly in our 
current economic milieu, rely on forfeiture proceeds.11  
In light of these issues, I propose a new approach to civil forfeiture 
reform. I argue that forfeiture should be seen as a transaction—one that 
transfers rights in property from the claimant to the seizing department. As 
such, different costs can affect the “market” for forfeiture. Within this 
framework, I suggest increasing the transaction costs of forfeiture and 
requiring police departments to internalize the externalities they impose on 
non-consenting parties (i.e., owners) in these actions. The idea, in essence, 
is to change the ex ante incentive structure to protect MVC and LVC from 
entering a system where defense is simply not economically rational. 
Increasing transaction costs—by requiring heightened procedural formality 
or by forcing immediate probable cause hearings for plaintiffs—would make 
police discount the value of any seized property against the costs of its 
seizure, with the hope that MVC and LVC will simply no longer be worth 
the effort.  
This Comment proceeds in five parts. In part I, I examine the history of 
forfeiture, beginning in Exodus and continuing through medieval England. 
I track the development of forfeiture law in the United States, before 
examining its initial deployment in the war against drugs in the early 1980s. 
I then discuss the vociferous criticism of forfeiture in the 1990s, which 
 
7 18 U.S.C. § 983(g)(3) (2012). 
8 See infra notes 233-238 and accompanying text.  
9 See infra notes 233-238 and accompanying text.  
10 See infra note 32 and accompanying text.  
11 See infra notes 239-242 and accompanying text.  
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eventually led to the passage of CAFRA, the federal forfeiture act in place 
today. 
In Part II, I turn to the statutory framework, examining CAFRA, 
followed by the particular forfeiture statutes of three states: North Carolina, 
Alaska, and Florida. Last, I look briefly at the intersection of federal and 
state law in the context of the doctrine of federal equitable sharing. 
After this general discussion of forfeiture, in Part III I narrow my focus 
to the aforementioned problem of MVC and LVC. I examine in detail the 
issues facing MVC and LVC, and explain why these two categories of 
chattel pose unique difficulties for any sort of protective framework. I also 
detail specific instances of abuse of MVC and LVC forfeiture.  
In Part IV, I turn to four proposed solutions for resolving forfeiture 
abuses (1) retaining the forfeiture status quo without reform, (2) expanding 
constitutional defenses, (3) stripping the profit motive from forfeiture, and 
(4) abolishing forfeiture entirely. I detail the advantages and disadvantages of 
these provisions, both generally and in the specific context of MVC and LVC. 
Finally, in Part V, I turn to my proposal: the transactional approach. 
First, I advance the idea of forfeiture as a transaction, specifically within the 
Calabresi–Melamed framework of rights transfer. Establishing forfeiture as 
transactional in nature, I then discuss three economic concepts that should 
inform forfeiture reform ideas: transaction costs, externalities, and “nudges.” 
I conclude by applying these concepts in the form of six proposed solutions. 
I. THE HISTORY OF CIVIL FORFEITURE 
Although this Comment largely focuses on the use and abuse of civil 
forfeiture in the twenty-first century, it is still worthwhile to turn to the 
ancient—indeed, biblical—roots of the practice. This historical detour 
proves germane to the discussion, as the unique development of civil 
forfeiture as legal fiction continues to resonate in modern Supreme Court 
opinions on the subject.12  
 
12 See, e.g., Various Items of Personal Prop. v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931) (“It is 
the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty.”); Todd 
Barnet, Legal Fiction and Forfeiture: An Historical Analysis of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 40 
DUQ. L. REV. 77, 94 (2001) (discussing the use of civil forfeiture as legal fiction to evade 
constitutional protections).  
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A. The Ancient Roots of the Practice 
The core conceit of civil forfeiture, that objects can be “guilty,” stems 
from Exodus: “When an ox gores a man or a woman to death, the ox shall 
be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall not 
be liable.”13 
The concept acquired additional substance in Medieval England, where 
it evolved into an action called deodand. Deodand—a transformation of an 
earlier action called noxal surrender, which involved surrendering property 
to the wronged party, rather than to the state—developed in the tenth 
century laws of Alfred the Great, and reflected a mixture of biblical ideas 
and Anglo-Saxon wergild traditions.14 Deodand required the surrender, 
directly to the Crown, of an object that had caused the death of a king’s 
subject.15 
Deodand became a source of revenue for the Crown before its eventual 
excision from the English common law in the early nineteenth century.16 
This form of forfeiture did not make its way into early U.S. common law. In 
fact, forfeiture laws, like the infamous “writs of assistance” that British 
 
13 Exodus 21:28; see also Alan Nicgorski, The Continuing Saga of Civil Forfeiture, the “War on 
Drugs,” and the Constitution: Determining the Constitutional Excessiveness of Civil Forfeitures, 91 NW. 
U. L. REV. 374, 378 (1996) (“[C]ivil forfeiture’s origins can be traced back as far as the Book of 
Exodus.”); Evan Williford, The Basics of Forfeiture: Testing the Limits of Constitutionality, 14 CRIM. 
JUST., Winter 2000, at 26, 27 (noting the biblical origins of forfeiture and quoting the same 
passage from Exodus).  
14 See generally Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, 
Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 181 (1973) 
(“The Laws of Alfred the Great were prefaced by a translation of chapters 21-22 of the Book of 
Exodus, and Christian—i.e., biblical—moral notions permeate much of the statement of the laws 
proper, even if the substance of the rules themselves may be thought to be largely pre-Christian in 
origin. It may nevertheless be conceded that the rule in Alfred, Ch. 13 . . . is a fair reflection of an 
early and widespread usage designated as the ‘noxal surrender.’” (footnote omitted)); Anna 
Pervukhin, Deodands: A Study in the Creation of Common Law Rules, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 237, 
241 (2005) (discussing the still mysterious transition from the practice of noxal surrender to 
deodand after the Norman conquest). 
15 See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974) (“The value 
of the instrument was forfeited to the King, in the belief that the King would provide the money 
for Masses to be said for the good of the dead man’s soul, or insure that the deodand was put to 
charitable uses.”); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 34 (Law Book Exch., 
Ltd. 2005) (1881) (tracing the evolution of deodand to the intrinsic desire to retaliate against the 
inanimate object itself ) ; Scott A. Hauert, Comment, An Examination of the Nature, Scope, and 
Extent of Statutory Civil Forfeiture, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 159, 163-64 (1994) (positing that 
deodand served a “revenue function” for the Crown).  
16 See Pervukhin, supra note 14, at 249 (describing how railroads, under intense pressure from 
a series of sky-high deodand judgments, eventually lobbied to have the practice abolished in 1849); 
Hauert, supra note 15, at 164-66 (tracking the evolution of deodand as a revenue producer for the 
Crown to its eventual end in the early nineteenth century).  
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customs agents enforced, were a major grievance of the Colonies and 
contributed to sparking the American Revolution.17 Consequently, the 
Constitution explicitly bans forfeiture of estate.18  
B. Uses Throughout American History 
Although common law forfeiture was not part of the U.S. tradition, 
statutory forfeiture achieved recognition as legitimate and played a role 
through the first two centuries of the republic.  
Early uses of civil forfeiture in the United States reflected the balance 
between controversies raised by estate forfeiture and the necessary revenue 
and enforcement goals of forfeiture actions. Many early forfeiture statutes, 
derived from the British Navigation Acts passed in the seventeenth century, 
targeted smugglers.19 A series of early Supreme Court cases upheld 
Congress’s authority to pass such statutes, distinguishing common law 
forfeiture from statutory forfeiture.20 These forfeiture acts were justified as 
necessary, as it was often easier for customs officials to seize smuggled 
 
17 See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682 (“Deodands did not become part of the common-law 
tradition of this country.”); Hauert, supra note 15, at 165 (“The repugnancy of deodands resulted in 
our Founding Fathers rejecting the institution as part of American common law.”); see also M.H. 
SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE 251-56 (1979) (describing how the vitriolic response to the 
writs of assistance led to the passage of the Fourth Amendment).  
18 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (“[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of 
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.”). 
19 See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 29, 39, 47-48 (allowing the federal govern-
ment to seize and civilly confiscate property for failure to pay duties on imports), repealed by Act 
of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 74, 1 Stat. 145, 178; Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm’rs, 3 U.S. 53, 54-56 (1795) 
(citing Resolution of November 25, 1775, enacted by the Continental Congress, which provided for 
the forfeiture of vessels and their cargoes used to supply British forces); MARIAN R. WILLIAMS 
ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEI-
TURE 10 (2010) (“American forfeiture law did not arise strictly from [deodand] but rather from the 
British Navigation Acts of the mid-17th century.”). For an in-depth look at the Navigation Acts, 
see Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Lessons from 
Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 95-96 (1996).  
20 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1 (1827), is perhaps the most cited of these cases. There, Justice Story, 
writing for the majority, explained the justification for statutory (as opposed to common law) civil 
forfeiture as allowing a proceeding directly against the property since “[t]he thing is here 
primarily considered as the offender.” Id. at 14.  
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property than to apprehend the smugglers themselves.21 However, these 
early uses of forfeiture were limited to enforcing admiralty jurisdiction.22  
These cases laid the legal foundation of forfeiture. However, the doctrine 
long remained dormant in the American legal landscape, emerging only 
briefly during the Civil War as the Confiscation Acts, which allowed for the 
seizure of property belonging to those who aided the rebellion.23 Similarly, 
government agents employed forfeiture to seize the profits and possessions 
of liquor smugglers during Prohibition.24 Under the National Prohibition 
Act,25 conveyances of intoxicating liquors were subject to forfeiture.26 The 
Act facilitated the seizure of automobiles belonging to liquor smugglers, as 
in United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile.27 
C. The Drug War and the Expansion of Forfeiture 
The use of forfeiture exploded with the onset of the drug war. The pas-
sage of the Comprehensive Drug Control Act (CDCA)28 in the early 1970s 
marked the first instance in which the government used civil forfeiture as a 
tool to combat drug trafficking. Calero-Toledo, a seminal forfeiture case from 
 
21 See Susan R. Klein, Civil In Rem Forfeiture and Double Jeopardy, 82 IOWA L. REV. 183, 191 
(1996) (discussing the early use of civil forfeiture to pursue privateers and smugglers); Sarah 
Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER, Aug. 12, 2013, at 49, 52 (“It was easier to prosecute a vessel and 
seize its cargo than to try to prosecute its owner, who might be an ocean away.”). 
22 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 10 (“The Supreme Court held that civil forfeiture 
was closely tied to the practical necessities of enforcing admiralty, piracy and customs laws.”); 
Klein, supra note 21, at 191 (“These forfeiture provisions applied primarily to two categories of 
items traveling on the high seas.”). 
23 E.g., An Act to Suppress Insurrection, to Punish Treason and Rebellion, to Seize and 
Confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for Other Purposes, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589 (1862); An Act to 
Confiscate Property for Insurrectionary Purposes, ch. 60, 12 Stat. 319 (1861). 
24 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 11 (briefly discussing the use of forfeiture against 
the tools of liquor smuggling); Nicgorski, supra note 13, at 381 (describing the brief use of 
forfeiture during Prohibition); Brent Skorup, Ensuring Eighth Amendment Protection From Excessive 
Fines in Civil Asset Forfeiture Cases, 22 GEO. MASON. U. C.R. L.J. 427, 433 (2012) (“When 
Prohibition began in the first half of the twentieth century, use of civil forfeiture reemerged and 
was expanded to combat criminal bootlegging networks.”).  
25 National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305, 317 (1919) (repealed 1933). 
26 See Brant C. Hadaway, Comment, Executive Privateers: A Discussion on Why the Civil Asset 
Forfeiture Reform Act Will Not Significantly Reform the Practice of Forfeiture, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 81, 
91 (2000) (discussing the use of the National Prohibition Act in expanding forfeiture during 
Prohibition).  
27 272 U.S. 321 (1926).  
28 Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012)); 
see also Nicgorski, supra note 13, at 375-76 (discussing the early use of civil forfeiture in the drug 
war).  
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this period, still provides much of the backbone supporting the modern 
understanding of and justification for the doctrine.29  
Forfeiture truly came to the fore with the passage of the 1984 Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act,30 which permitted law enforcement to use forfeited 
funds.31 The resulting revenue gains have been staggering: in 2012 the 
government seized $4.2 billion in property and has enjoyed other notable 
achievements, such as the seizure of real estate properties from Latin 
American drug kingpins.32  
In spite of the trumpeted successes of civil forfeiture, stories of abuse 
began to trickle into the national media. Federal officials killed reclusive 
millionaire Donald Scott when he resisted arrest during a raid on his ranch 
in search of marijuana plants, which, if found, would have allowed for the 
seizure of his property.33 Willie Jones, a Tennessee man, had $9600 in 
cash—which he had accumulated to purchase shrubbery for his business—
confiscated for no reason other than that drug dogs alerted authorities to 
the presence of trace drug residue on his cash.34 Mr. Jones’s case so alarmed 
 
29 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974) (“But whether the 
reason for [the forfeiture] be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial 
jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced.” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
30 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2012)). 
31 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 12 (describing the new profit incentive in the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act); Stillman, supra note 21, at 53 (noting that forfeiture remained 
an “infrequent resort” until the passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act). The Act 
allowed for broad uses of forfeited funds. See 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1)(F)(i) (2012) (allowing the use 
of forfeited funds to equip “law enforcement functions of any Government-owned or leased vessel, 
vehicle, or aircraft available for official use by any Federal agency participating in the Fund”). 
32 See Stillman, supra note 21, at 53 (“Last year, the department took in nearly $4.2 billion in 
forfeitures, a record. . . . The federal government seized a four-hundred-acre Montana ranch tied 
to the Colombian drug kingpin Pablo Escobar, and laid claim to the bank accounts of assorted 
Wall Street con men.”); Jean Thompson, $20 Million in Property Seized, MIAMI SUN-SENTINEL 
(Dec. 1, 1987), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1987-12-01/news/8702080899_1_kellner-cocaine-
property, archived at http://perma.cc/NTZ6-8B9B (describing the seizure of over $20 million in 
properties from the Escobar cocaine cartel, including a “$480,910 bayfront mansion in a Miami 
Beach neighborhood; a $1.9 million, 45-unit apartment complex on a Biscayne Bay island in 
Miami; a $442,000, three-bedroom Bal Harbour condominium; and a ranch near Ocala”).  
33 See Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic 
Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 74-75 (1998) (detailing the raid and shooting of Scott); Stillman, 
supra note 21, at 53 (describing Donald Scott’s death). 
34 See Jones v. DEA, 819 F. Supp. 698, 706-07 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (detailing the basic facts of 
the case and invalidating the forfeiture because almost all U.S. currency contains trace amounts of 
narcotics); Williford, supra note 13, at 27 (describing the arrest of Mr. Jones).  
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Representative Henry Hyde that he brought Jones to testify before 
Congress during the passage of CAFRA.35 
Moreover, three seminal Supreme Court cases from the 1990s showed the 
limitations of constitutional protections against abuses of civil forfeiture, 
sparking cries for reform. The first, Bennis v. Michigan, turned on the forfei-
ture of a car in a prostitution sting.36 Mrs. Bennis claimed that although her 
husband had been using the car to solicit prostitutes, she—as an innocent 
owner—should not have to forfeit her interest in the car.37 Unfortunately, the 
Court ruled against Mrs. Bennis, holding that there was no innocent owner 
defense absent statutory intervention.38  
In United States v. Ursery, a man growing marijuana on his property 
contended that its seizure, conducted after a prosecution against him, 
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.39 The Court disagreed, ruling that a 
civil in rem forfeiture action is not punitive, and therefore not violative of 
the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.40 
Finally, in United States v. Bajakajian, the Court addressed the “excessive 
fines” issue.41 Bajakajian secretly attempted to take $357,144 out of the 
United States in violation of customs reporting requirements.42 Although 
the government sought forfeiture of the entire sum, the Court did not 
permit it, finding the seizure of the entire amount disproportionate to the 
conduct authorizing its forfeiture.43 
 
35 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
104th Cong. 12-14 (1996) (statement of Willie Jones) (describing to Congress how the Drug 
Enforcement Administration seized his cash and expressing his frustration at how easily an 
“innocent person can get caught up” in forfeiture).  
36 516 U.S. 442, 443 (1996).  
37 Id. at 444 (“Petitioner defended against the abatement of her interest in the car on the 
ground that, when she entrusted her husband to use the car, she did not know that he would use it 
to violate Michigan’s indecency law.”). 
38 Id. at 454 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“As detailed in the Court’s opinion and the cases cited 
therein, forfeiture of property without proof of the owner’s wrongdoing, merely because it was 
‘used’ in or was an ‘instrumentality’ of crime has been permitted in England and this country, both 
before and after the adoption of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
39 518 U.S. 267, 273 (1995).  
40 Id. at 270-71 (“[C]ivil forfeitures . . . do not constitute ‘punishment’ for purposes of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.”). 
41 524 U.S. 321 (1998). For a more thorough discussion of the excessive fines issue, see infra 
notes 160-171 and accompanying text.  
42 524 U.S. at 324-25.  
43 Id. at 339-40 (“Comparing the gravity of respondent’s crime with the $357,144 forfeiture 
the Government seeks, we conclude that such a forfeiture would be grossly disproportional to the 
gravity of his offense. It is larger than the $5,000 fine imposed by the District Court by many orders 
of magnitude, and it bears no articulable correlation to any injury suffered by the Government.”). 
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These cases, particularly Bennis, and the widely reported abuses of civil 
forfeiture eventually ratcheted up pressure on Congress to enact major 
reform. This reform materialized as CAFRA, the dominant paradigm of 
civil forfeiture today. 44 
II. FORFEITURE LAW TODAY 
A. The National Landscape 
Nowadays, forfeiture remains an intricate system, not merely due to 
the complexity of CAFRA, but also because of the interlocking nexuses 
between state and multiple aspects of federal law. Thus, we must briefly 
explore how federal forfeiture works, how state forfeiture works, and, finally, 
the intersection between these two sets of laws.  
1. Federal Law 
Federal forfeiture laws are extremely complicated. As one scholar has 
suggested, “CAFRA does not replace, but is superimposed upon, the 
existing procedures in the customs laws, the Supplemental Rules, and the 
forfeiture statutes themselves.”45 
a. CAFRA 
CAFRA is the natural starting point for discussing the national forfei-
ture landscape. CAFRA reformed several of the most troubling aspects of 
forfeiture, as fleshed out in courts during the 1990s. For instance, CAFRA 
explicitly provides for an innocent owner defense, responding to concerns 
Bennis invoked.46 Similarly, § 983(g) implements the ruling in Bajakajian 
and requires proportionality in forfeiture.47 
Other critical changes relate to the burden of proof. CAFRA increased 
the level of proof necessary for forfeiture, requiring the government to 
 
44 See Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012)).  
45 Stefan D. Cassella, The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Expanded Government 
Forfeiture Authority and Strict Deadlines Imposed on All Parties, 27 J. LEGIS. 97, 103 (2001).  
46 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) (2012) (“An innocent owner’s interest in property shall not be for-
feited under any civil forfeiture statute. The claimant shall have the burden of proving that the 
claimant is an innocent owner by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
47 Id. § 983(g)(4) (“If the court finds that the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the 
offense it shall reduce or eliminate the forfeiture as necessary to avoid a violation of the Excessive 
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.”). 
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prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is subject to 
forfeiture.48  
Finally, some of the provisions are aimed at reducing litigation hardships 
to claimants. Section 983(b)(1)(A) allows for indigent claimants—in 
narrow circumstances—to receive court-appointed counsel.49 Similarly, 
§ 983(f)(1)(C) provides for the release of property during proceedings to a 
claimant who can show that government retention of the property will cause 
“undue hardship” to the claimant.50  
b. Customs Rules and Other Federal Laws 
While CAFRA provides the dominant framework for federal forfeiture, 
it does not stand alone. Rather, it interacts with a complex set of other 
provisions and statutes that provide for specific forfeiture for various federal 
offenses. This can prove extremely complicated:  
For example, 19 U.S.C. § 1615 says the burden of proof is on the property 
owner in any civil forfeiture case brought under a statute incorporating the 
customs laws. Section 981(d) still incorporates the customs laws and § 1615 
has not been amended; but § 983(c) says the burden of proof is on the gov-
ernment in any case brought under any “civil forfeiture statute,” as that 
term is defined in § 983(i). Which statute applies when a civil forfeiture 
action is filed under § 981? Because § 983(c) is inconsistent with the cus-
toms provision on this issue, it overrides § 1615 and the burden of proof is 
on the government.51  
 
48 Id. § 983(c)(1) (“In a suit or action brought under any civil forfeiture statute for the civil 
forfeiture of any property, the burden of proof is on the Government to establish, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture.”); see also 13 FED. PROC., L. ED. 
§ 35:773 (“Under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), in a suit or action brought 
under any civil forfeiture statute for the civil forfeiture of any property, the burden of proof is on 
the government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to 
forfeiture.” (citation omitted)).  
49 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(1)(A) (“If a person with standing to contest the forfeiture of property in 
a judicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute is financially unable to obtain 
representation by counsel, and the person is represented by counsel appointed under section 3006A of 
this title in connection with a related criminal case, the court may authorize counsel to represent that 
person with respect to the claim.”). Counsel is also available should the claimant be faced with the 
forfeiture of his or her primary residence. Id. § 983(b)(2)(A).  
50 Id. § 983(f)(1)(C) (“A claimant under subsection (a) is entitled to immediate release of 
seized property if the continued possession by the Government pending the final disposition of 
forfeiture proceedings will cause substantial hardship to the claimant, such as preventing the 
functioning of a business, preventing an individual from working, or leaving an individual 
homeless.”). 
51 Cassella, supra note 45, at 103 (citations omitted).  
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Outside of the customs context, CAFRA interacts with a host of other 
obscure federal forfeiture provisions. For instance, CAFRA applies to 
forfeiture carried out by the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National 
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration.52 However, § 983(i) 
carves out specific forfeiture proceedings to which CAFRA does not apply 
including, for example, customs forfeiture generally.53 Straightforward 
application of CAFRA is confused here because, despite the general exclu-
sion of customs rules from CAFRA, some statutes enforced by U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection—for example, currency reporting statutes—
are nevertheless subject to its dictates.54 
2. State Law 
In addition to federal law, different states’ laws also include unique 
forfeiture provisions. Some relevant axes of comparison include the 
standard of proof for seizure, which party bears the burden in the innocent 
owner defense, the amount of time prosecutors have to file forfeiture 
actions after seizures, and the amount of value that may be retained by the 
seizing department. Below, I examine the representative cases of North 
Carolina, Alaska, and Florida.  
a. North Carolina 
North Carolina has no state civil forfeiture in rem action.55 Property 
owners must be convicted of a crime before being forced to forfeit property.56 
North Carolina’s lack of a civil forfeiture statute earned it an “A” from the 
 
52 Id. at 103-04 (detailing forfeiture provisions with which CAFRA interacts).  
53 18 U.S.C. § 983(i) (“In this section, the term ‘civil forfeiture statute’ (1) means any provi-
sion of Federal law providing for the forfeiture of property other than as a sentence imposed upon 
conviction of a criminal offense; and (2) does not include (A) the Tariff Act of 1930 or any other 
provision of law codified in title 19; (B) the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; (C) the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.); (D) the Trading with the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. 
App. 1 et seq.) or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) (50 U.S.C. 1701 et 
seq.); or (E) section 1 of title VI of the Act of June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. 233; 22 U.S.C. 401).”); see also 
Cassella, supra note 45, at 104 (listing civil forfeitures exempted under CAFRA).  
54 Cassella, supra note 45, at 104.  
55 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 90–112 (West 2013).  
56 See State v. Hill, 570 S.E.2d 768, 769 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (“It is important to note that 
our forfeiture provisions operate in personam and that forfeiture normally follows conviction.”); 
State v. Johnson, 478 S.E.2d 16, 25 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (“G.S. § 90-112(a)(2) is a criminal, or in 
personam, forfeiture statute, as opposed to a civil or in rem, forfeiture statute.”). 
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Institute for Justice (IJ) in its state rankings.57 However, despite the lack of 
state forfeiture proceedings, North Carolina police still make use of federal 
equitable sharing. 58  
b. Alaska 
Alaska, by contrast, earned one of the IJ’s lowest grades, an “F,” for its 
state civil forfeiture statute.59 Alaska’s statute causes several major problems 
for property owners. First, property can be forfeited for probable cause.60 
Second, the innocent owner bears the burden of proof in that defense.61 
Finally, property owners must move quickly, as the statute affords only 
thirty days to contest the seizure.62 
The Alaska statute also creates problematic incentives for law enforcement. 
First, the statute allows law enforcement to keep a high percentage of 
profits that result from forfeiture.63 Moreover, there is no legal requirement 
to track forfeiture data in the state, meaning that it is almost impossible to 
collect systematic data on the level of forfeiture occurring in Alaska.64 As 
such, knowing that there is no system of public accountability or oversight, 
police have every incentive to seize as much property as possible.  
 
57 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 80. The IJ embarked on a massive survey of state civil 
forfeiture practice in 2010. In the study, the IJ ranked the states on both the quality of the state’s 
own civil forfeiture laws and its abuse of equitable sharing. Id. at 41-42. The results were troubling: 
twenty-two states scored a “D” or lower on the IJ test and the highest overall grade received was 
Maine’s “A-.” Id. at 43-44.  
58 The state’s extensive use of equitable sharing pulled down its final grade to a “C+”. Id. at 8. 
For a discussion of federal equitable sharing, see infra subsection II.A.3.  
59 Id. at 46.  
60 ALASKA STAT. § 17.30.114(a) (2013).  
61 Id. § 17.30.110(4)(A) (“[A] conveyance may not be forfeited under this paragraph if the 
owner of the conveyance establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, at a hearing before the 
court as the trier of fact, that use of the conveyance in violation of this chapter or AS 11.71 was 
committed by another person and that the owner was neither a consenting party nor privy to the 
violation.”); see also State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 113-14 (Alaska 1981) (finding that substantive due 
process concerns mandate an innocent owner defense). 
62 ALASKA STAT. § 17.30.116(b). 
63 Id. § 17.30.112(c) (“When forfeiting property under (a) of this section, a court may award 
to a municipal law enforcement agency that participated in the arrest or conviction of the 
defendant, the seizure of property, or the identification of property for seizure, (1) the property if 
the property is worth $5,000 or less and is not money or some other thing that is divisible, or (2) 
up to 75 percent of the property or the value of the property if the property is worth more than 
$5,000 or is money or some other thing that is divisible.”).  
64 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 46. 
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c. Florida  
Finally, Florida, which earned a “D+” in the IJ rankings, is an interesting 
middle ground between the two extremes of North Carolina and Alaska.65 
Florida law increases protections for property owners in some instances, 
while simultaneously undercutting rights in others.  
Florida raises the burden of proof for the government, allowing forfeiture 
only upon a showing of “clear and convincing evidence.”66 Moreover, the 
government bears the burden of proof in an innocent owner defense.67 
Finally, the Florida statute has an explicit policy objective of vindicating 
property rights.68 
However, Florida allows only twenty days for the property owner to 
contest the forfeiture action—fewer than even Alaska.69 More troubling is 
the fact that Florida law enforcement retains eighty percent or higher of 
forfeiture proceeds, creating problematic incentives.70 The short window for 
 
65 Id. at 53. 
66 FLA. STAT. § 932.704(8) (2011). 
67 Id. § 932.704(6)(a) (“Property may not be forfeited under the Florida Contraband Forfei-
ture Act unless the seizing agency establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the owner 
either knew, or should have known after a reasonable inquiry, that the property was being 
employed or was likely to be employed in criminal activity.”). But see Gomez v. Village of 
Pinecrest, 41 So. 3d 180, 188 (Fla. 2010) (distinguishing “seizure” from “forfeiture” and finding 
that, at the seizure stage, the seizing agency need only establish “probable cause that the property 
was used in violation of the Act”).  
68 FLA. STAT. § 932.704(1) (“It is the policy of this state that law enforcement agencies shall 
utilize the provisions of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act to deter and prevent the continued 
use of contraband articles for criminal purposes while protecting the proprietary interests of 
innocent owners and lienholders and to authorize such law enforcement agencies to use the 
proceeds collected under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act as supplemental funding for 
authorized purposes. The potential for obtaining revenues from forfeitures must not override 
fundamental considerations such as public safety, the safety of law enforcement officers, or the 
investigation and prosecution of criminal activity. It is also the policy of this state that law 
enforcement agencies ensure that, in all seizures made under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture 
Act, their officers adhere to federal and state constitutional limitations regarding an individual’s 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, including, but not limited to, the illegal 
use of stops based on a pretext, coercive-consent searches, or a search based solely upon an 
individual’s race or ethnicity.”). Florida courts take this policy statement quite seriously. See, e.g., 
Sheriff of Seminole Cnty. v. Oliver, 59 So. 3d 232, 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (reading the 
policy portion of the statute to disallow the forfeiture of checks the sheriff knew were stolen from 
an innocent owner, even though forfeited checks technically met the definition of “contraband 
articles”).  
69 Compare FLA. STAT. § 932.704(5)(c), with ALASKA STAT. § 17.30.116(b) (2013).  
70 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 53 (discussing Florida’s IJ ranking); Jefferson E. Hol-
comb et al., Civil Asset Forfeiture, Equitable Sharing, and Policing for Profit in the United States, 39 J. 
CRIM. JUST. 273, 277 tbl.1 (2011) (showing the percentage of forfeiture proceeds that may be used 
by law enforcement in different states). 
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contesting seizure, combined with high profit retention, incentivizes police 
to seize as much property as possible, knowing that most of the value will 
revert to their departments.71 
3. The Interrelation: Equitable Sharing 
Equitable sharing is the final element of the national forfeiture landscape. 
Equitable sharing gives state officers the ability to access favorable federal 
forfeiture statutes, thereby bypassing restrictive state statutes.72  
Under the doctrine of equitable sharing, any state or local law enforcement 
agency that directly participates in an investigation or prosecution resulting 
in a federal forfeiture may request an equitable share of the net proceeds of 
the forfeiture.73 Two paths lie open to agencies seeking to participate in 
equitable sharing: joint investigation or adoption.74 
The joint investigation path is far less controversial. In a joint investiga-
tion, local or state (or even foreign) agencies cooperating with or working 
alongside federal officials can share in a split of the proceeds.75 
Adoption is much more controversial. Adoption allows a local law 
enforcement agency that has seized property to turn the property over to 
federal officials.76 When the seized property passes the necessary monetary 
thresholds and also violates federal law—as is often the case with drug 
laws—federal officials will step in and proceed with the forfeiture under 
federal law.77  
 
71 For a more thorough discussion of the perverse profit incentive, see infra notes 219-244 and 
accompanying text.  
72 See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 51-56 (agreeing that equitable sharing incentiv-
izes police to bypass more restrictive state statutes); Holcomb et al., supra note 70, at 274-75 
(describing the motivations to bypass state law via equitable sharing); Kyla Dunn, Reining in 
Forfeiture: Common Sense Reform in the War on Drugs, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/forfeiture.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3QQT-RFUB (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2015) (“[P]olice are circumventing their own state law in order to continue reaping 
the financial rewards of civil asset forfeiture.”). 
73 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING FOR STATE AND LOCAL 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 3 (2009) (outlining which nonfederal agencies are eligible for 
equitable sharing). 
74 Id. at 6.  
75 Id.  
76 Id.; see also Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 51 (“The equitable sharing program 
includes a ‘federal adoption’ procedure, whereby state police who turn seized assets over to the 
Justice Department for ‘federal forfeiture’ receive back up to 80 percent of the assets’ value, to be 
used exclusively for law enforcement purposes.”).  
77 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 73, at 6 (outlining the requirements for federal adop-
tion of a state or local seizure); see also Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 51 n.64 (“Seizures 
accomplished exclusively by state or local agencies may be ‘adopted’ by the federal government 
whenever the conduct giving rise to the seizure is in violation of federal law.”).  
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Adoption is a much more dubious policy than joint investigation because 
it allows state and local officials to circumvent stricter state requirements 
regarding forfeiture by substituting more relaxed federal standards.78 For 
instance, states with stringent homestead exemptions may find that equitable 
sharing evades these protections, as a state homestead exemption is not a 
defense under federal law.79 
Moreover, adoption requires that the recipient agency “benefit directly 
from the sharing.”80 Thus, agencies thwart state laws prohibiting police from 
retaining a share of the proceeds from civil forfeiture, as officers may receive 
funds from federal coffers. Indeed, empirical studies have backed up 
anecdotal evidence that state officers are likely to resort to equitable sharing 
to evade stricter state rules, particularly with regard to distribution of 
profits.81 
Immediately before this article’s publication, outgoing Attorney General 
Eric Holder took steps to constrain the Equitable Sharing Program.82 
 
78 See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 51 n.64; Holcomb et al., supra note 70, at 274 
(“In effect, adoptive forfeitures allow state and local law enforcement to circumvent their own state 
laws and utilize federal law for processing forfeitures.”); Stillman, supra note 21, at 58 (detailing 
some of the abuses of equitable sharing).  
79 See DEE EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEITURE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN STATE 
AND FEDERAL COURTS 248 (2008) (“A state homestead exemption is not a defense to a federal real 
property forfeiture case because the federal supremacy clause preempts the state exemption . . . . 
Therefore, in jurisdictions with state homestead exemptions, law enforcement will use the federal 
forfeiture system for any real property that may be exempted under state law.”). 
80 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 73, at 22.  
81 Holcomb et al., supra note 70 at 282 (demonstrating empirically that law enforcement 
agencies tend to resort to equitable sharing to receive a more generous portion of the proceeds 
from forfeiture). Academics have observed that, “when state laws make forfeiture more difficult 
and less rewarding, agencies are even more apt to turn to the federal government’s easier and more 
generous forfeiture procedures.” Id. The Holcomb study supports numerous unsystematic pieces 
of evidence that suggests state officials manipulate equitable sharing programs to their economic 
advantage. See, e.g., Stillman, supra note 21, at 58 (“In Bal Harbour, Florida . . . a small vice squad 
ran a forfeiture network that brought in nearly fifty million dollars in just three years . . . . [M]uch 
of it had already been spent: on luxury-car rentals and first-class plane tickets to pursue 
stings . . . ; on a hundred-thousand-dollar police boat; and on a twenty-one-thousand-dollar drug-
prevention beach party.”). But see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 73, at 35-37 (providing a list 
of acceptable uses for equitable sharing funds, including “establish[ing] a detoxification center”).  
82
 David Post, Rule of Law 1, Outrageous Police Power 0: Eric Holder Limits Asset-Seizure “Equi-
table Sharing” Program, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 17, 2015), http://washingtonpost.com/news/ 
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/17/rule-of-law-1-outrageous-police-power-0-eric-holder-limits-asset- 
seizure-equitable-sharing-program, archived at http://perma.cc/C3PK-4CK2; see also Rober 
O’Harrow, Jr., Sari Horwitz & Steven Rich, Holder Limits Seized-Asset Sharing Process That Split 
Billions with Local, State Police, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2015), http://washingtonpost.com/ 
investigations/holder-ends-seized-asset-sharing-process-that-split-billions-with-local-state-police/ 
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Specifically, Holder dramatically pared back the adoption process discussed 
above, limiting adoption to “property that directly relates to public safety 
concerns, including firearms, ammunition, explosives, and property associated 
with child pornography.”83 While Holder’s action is a step in the right 
direction, critics rightly point out that potential for abuse still exists.84 For 
instance, police departments can still form joint task forces with federal 
officials to seize assets.85 Hundreds of such task forces already exist around 
the country.86 It is also unclear how long-lasting Holder’s unilateral action 
on the process will be. Nevertheless, it is still a step in the right direction 
towards reforming civil forfeiture. 
B. Arguments for Robust Civil Forfeiture Laws 
This convoluted system of laws has led to dramatic results in practice. 
Many proponents of civil forfeiture are quick to point out its benefits: crime 
control, increased drug arrests, and a steady stream of money for otherwise 
cash-strapped police departments.87  
A Justice Department memorandum cites several of the concrete benefits 
of forfeiture. For instance, the practice can be employed to seize electronics 
used to distribute child pornography or to shut down large marijuana 
farms.88 Police can also repurpose the instrumentalities of crime. Dramatically, 
in Tulsa, Oklahoma, “cops drive a Cadillac Escalade stenciled with the 
 
2015/01/16/0e7ca058-99d4-11e4-bcfb-059ec7a93ddc_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6G76-
GXR3.  
83
 Jacob Sullum, Despite Holder’s Forfeiture Reform, Cops Still Have a License to Steal, FORBES 
(Jan. 22, 2015, 4:04 p.m.), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2015/01/22/despite-holders-
forfeiture-reform-cops-still-have-a-license-to-steal, archived at http://perma.cc/UT9x-GRKV 
(quoting Prohibition on Certain Federal Adoptions of Seizures by State and Local Law Enforce-
ment Agencies, Attn’y Gen. Order (Jan. 16, 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/01/16/attorney_general_order_prohibiting_ 
adoptions.pdf). 
84
 See id. (noting that the order “did not put an end to civil forfeiture”). 
85 Id. 
86
 Id. 
87 See John L. Worrall, Asset Forfeiture, PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE RE-
SPONSE GUIDES SERIES, No. 7, at 2 (2008) (“Though it is an enforcement tool, asset forfeiture 
can assist in the budgeting realm by helping to offset the costs associated with fighting crime.”).  
88 See generally Stefan D. Cassella, Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States, 17 S. 
AFR. J. CRIM. JUST. 347, 347, 360-62 (2004) (citing some concrete benefits of civil forfeiture, 
including “[s]hut[ting] down the ‘crack house’”); Worrall, supra note 87, at 21-25 (providing some 
concrete examples of problems solved by forfeiture, including street racing and prostitution). 
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words ‘THIS USED TO BE A DRUG DEALER’S CAR, NOW IT’S 
OURS!’”89  
Outside of seizing the direct instrumentalities of crime, civil forfeiture 
provides other related benefits. For instance, forfeiture strips criminals of 
their lavish lifestyles, sending the message that “crime doesn’t pay.”90 This 
separates the profit motive from crime. Moreover, forfeiture allows for the 
seizure of assets that can be used to establish a recovery fund for victims,91 
as demonstrated recently in the aftermath of the Madoff scam.92  
From a macro perspective, civil forfeiture has resulted in a massive level 
of asset seizures: the overall federal fund currently stands at $4.2 billion.93 
Other stories of success abound. For example, Deutsche Bank forfeited 
$403.8 million in late September 2011 as part of a settlement for allowing 
fraudulent tax shelters.94 The U.S. Marshal’s website provides a listing of all 
properties currently for sale, including the house once used by the infamous 
Russian spies captured in 2010.95 
 
89 Stillman, supra note 21, at 50. 
90 See Cassella, supra note 88, at 348 (“Taking the criminals’ toys away . . . sends a signal to 
the community that the benefits of a life of crime are illusory and temporary at best.”); Worrall, 
supra note 87, at 13 (“[Forfeiture] is intended to reduce criminal activity by denying offenders the 
profits from their crimes.”).  
91 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(6) (2012) (authorizing forfeiture to be used “as restoration to 
any victim of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture, including, in the case of a money laundering 
offense, any offense constituting the underlying specified unlawful activity”); Cassella, supra note 
88, at 348 (“[R]estoration of property to victims in white-collar cases is the first priority of law 
enforcement when it comes to disbursing forfeited property.”); Richard Weber, Introduction, 55 
U.S. ATTYS’ BULL. 1, 6 (2007) (identifying one of the guiding principles of civil forfeiture as 
“[r]estor[ing] property to crime victims”).  
92 See Grant McCool, Ruth Madoff Forfeits Asset Claims, Left with $2.5 million, REUTERS, June 
27, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/27/us-madoff-ruth-idUSTRE55Q0 
BF20090627 (describing the forfeiture of the Madoff’s assets); Larry Neumeister, Peter Madoff, 
Bernie Madoff ’s Brother, to Forfeit $143.1 Billion on Fraud Charges, HUFFINGTON POST ( June 27, 
2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/27/peter-madoff-bernie-madoff_n_1632124.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Y4AG-QKG8 (reporting that Peter Madoff “agreed to the criminal 
forfeiture of $143 billion, including all of his real estate and personal property”). 
93 Stillman, supra note 21 at 53. For current information on the fund, see U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND, FY 2013 PERFORMANCE BUDGET (2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013justification/pdf/fy13-aff-justification.pdf.  
94 See TREASURY EXEC. OFFICE FOR ASSET FORFEITURE, TREASURY FORFEITURE FUND, 
FY 2013 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET SUBMISSION 4 (2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/ 
about/budget-performance/Documents/17%20-%20FY%202013%20TEOAF%20CJ.pdf (“Deutsche 
Bank AG (Deutsche Bank) forfeited $403.8 million in late September 2011.”).  
95 Asset Forfeiture Program—Current Auctions/Sales, U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, http:// 
www.usmarshals.gov/assets/sales.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/GG7E-
DGWH.  
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III. REFINING THE ISSUE 
As stated in the thesis, the challenge of civil forfeiture is determining 
how to finely tune the incentives underlying the program. Police should be 
encouraged to go after big-ticket items while maintaining the personal 
property of innocent individuals safe from government seizure.  
After the more general discussion above, I refine the focus here. Since 
forfeiture allows for seizure of both real property and chattel, the distinction 
between the two is a natural and important one to make.96 In addition to 
separating chattel from real property, chattel itself ought to be divided into 
three categories: high-value chattel (HVC) (value higher than $10,000), 
mid-value chattel (MVC) (value between $2000 and $10,000); and low-value 
chattel (LVC) (value less than $2000).  
Of these, I will focus on MVC and LVC for several reasons. First, 
CAFRA imposes additional protections for real property. For instance, real 
property can never be the subject of administrative forfeiture; notice is 
required.97 Second, there is also a more resilient innocent owner defense for 
real property.98 Finally, there is an additional statute linked to CAFRA, 
section 985, which provides further safeguards for real property.99  
I also exclude HVC for two reasons. First, police should be encouraged to 
pursue HVC, as it most strongly meets the justifications for civil forfeiture: 
stripping away the instrumentalities of crime or removing the fruits of 
criminal success.100 More importantly, the intrinsic value of HVC forfeiture 
means that a legal defense is economically rational. 
The economic rationality of defense is central to this Comment. Defense 
in forfeiture actions is expensive, and counsel is often not provided for 
indigent defendants.101 Lawyers’ fees only add to this cost, meaning that 
 
96 I lump movable currency in with chattel, although there are clearly distinctions between 
the two. The general focus, however, is less on the difference between property conceptions of 
chattel and monetary instruments, and more on the inherent value of the property at question. 
Thus, for ease of reference, chattel and currency will be considered together.  
97 See 18 U.S.C. § 985(c)(1) (2012) (providing for notice in civil forfeiture proceedings against 
property). Even before the passage of CAFRA, the Court recognized that forfeitures of real 
property required notice. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 52-60 
(1993) (reciting the reasons for requiring notice before forfeiture of real property).  
98 See 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(3)(B)(i) (refusing to apply exceptions to the innocent owner 
defense if the property in question is the claimant’s primary residence); Holcomb et al., supra note 
70, at 277 tbl.2 (pointing to several states, including Alabama, Kentucky, and Maine, in which the 
government has the burden in the innocent owner defense only for real property).  
99 For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 985(b)(1)(B) provides that real property owners who are subject 
to forfeiture may not be evicted during the pendency of that action.  
100 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.  
101 CAFRA only provides for counsel for indigent defendants in narrowly defined circum-
stances. 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(1)(A) (“If a person with standing to contest the forfeiture of property 
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HVC is oftentimes the only chattel worth defending; for instance, the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) estimates that the average cost of 
forfeiture defense in Georgia exceeds $5000.102  
Circumstantial evidence indicates that it is often only real property or 
HVC that merits a defense. Indeed, all of the seminal forfeiture cases 
involve the defense of real property or HVC. In Calero-Toledo, for instance, 
the property at issue was a yacht;103 in Bajakajian the government sought the 
forfeiture of over $300,000;104 and in United States v. James Daniel Good Real 
Property, the property at issue was Mr. Good’s home.105 Since MVC and 
LVC often do not economically merit a defense, very few forfeiture cases 
are contested at all; the rate of contested cases pre- and post-CAFRA has 
only been about twenty percent.106  
Thus, I seek to construct a system that allows for the maximum protection 
for mid- and low-value chattel. The focus on MVC and LVC is important, 
as these items represent the lion’s share of forfeitures. For instance, in 
Georgia, the police seized $2.76 million in forfeitures in 2011; items worth 
$650 or less comprised more than half of this amount.107 
 
in a judicial civil forfeiture proceeding . . . is financially unable to obtain representation by 
counsel, and the person is represented by counsel . . . in connection with a related criminal case, 
the court may authorize counsel to represent that person with respect to the claim.”). Even vis-à-
vis counsel, CAFRA extends additional protections to real property. See id. § 983(b)(2)(A) 
(ensuring legal defense when a claimant is defending his or her residence).  
102 Chloe Cockburn, Easy Money: Civil Asset Forfeiture Abuse by Police, ACLU (Feb. 3, 2010, 
1:16 PM), https://www.aclu.org/print/blog/criminal-law-reform/easy-money-civil-asset-forfeiture-
abuse-police, archived at http://perma.cc/N35A-MWEA.  
103 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 664 (1974). 
104 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998). 
105 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 46 (1993). 
106 See Oversight of Federal Asset Forfeiture: Its Role in Fighting Crime: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 90 (1999) 
(statement of Roger Pilon, Dir., Cato Ctr. for Constitutional Studies) (“The Justice Department’s 
principal spokesman for forfeiture has claimed that 80 percent of forfeitures are uncontested.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Cassella, supra note 88, at 354 n.20 (“Prior to the enactment 
of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) estimated that 85 percent of forfeitures in drug cases were uncontested. Since CAFRA, 
which made it easier to contest a forfeiture action, the number of uncontested DEA cases has 
dropped to 80 percent.”); Mike Fishburn, Gored by the Ox: A Discussion of the Federal and Texas 
Laws that Empower Civil-Asset Forfeiture, 26 RUTGERS L. REC. 4, 19 (2002) (“About eighty 
percent of all civil-forfeiture cases are uncontested.”).  
107 See Stillman, supra note 21, at 57 (“In 2011 . . . fifty-eight local, county, and statewide 
police forces in Georgia brought in $2.76 million in forfeitures; more than half the items taken 
were worth less than six hundred and fifty dollars.”); see also Nick Sibilla, DA’s Office in Georgia 
Used Asset Forfeiture Funds on Booze, Steak, Galas, and to See Ceelo Green, INST. FOR JUST. (Oct. 11, 
2013) [hereinafter Sibilla, DA’s Office in Georgia], http://ij.org/da-s-office-in-georgia-used-asset-forfeiture-
funds-on-booze-steak-galas-and-to-see-ceelo-green, archived at http://perma.cc/3Z78-A7KW (“As for 
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The dispersion of the practice is hard to estimate, as many states simply 
do not report forfeiture data.108 However, a survey on Westlaw is revealing. 
Perusing the first fifty results for a search for “Civil Forfeiture” within a 
three-month time frame returned forty-eight results that constitute HVC.109 
Representative cases like United States v. 2,000,000 in U.S. Currency110 or 
United States v. 2005 Porsche Cayenne111 dominate the landscape. Only two 
results were even in the realm of MVC: United States v. Approximately $3,199 
in U.S. Currency112 and United States v. One 2005 Jeep Cherokee Ltd.113 
LVC is not represented at all in this search. We can thus infer that it is 
simply not worth the time or energy to contest the seizure of LVC. Police, 
then, can essentially seize LVC without check. Protecting this type of chattel 
is rendered even more important because police are often incentivized to 
pursue MVC and LVC forfeiture: “When there’s less than $2,000 at stake, 
law enforcement agencies in the state get to keep 70 percent of what they 
take. If more than $2,000 is taken, departments can keep half.”114 
 
the property being seized in the Peach State, the median value was worth $647. Evidently, 
forfeiture mainly targets working-class Georgians, not drug kingpins.”); Nick Sibilla, Seize First, 
Ask Questions Later: Philadelphia Police Take Over $6 Million a Year in Civil Asset Forfeiture, INST. 
FOR JUST., http://ij.org/seize-first-ask-questions-later-philadelphia-police-take-over-6-million-a-
year-in-civil-asset-forfeiture (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
T6VU-E4SH (“The average amount of cash taken in a currency forfeiture case was $550, while some 
cases involved amounts less than $100, belying the myth that forfeiture mainly takes money from drug 
kingpins.”). 
108 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 27 (explaining that only nineteen states provide 
“reliably useful information” about forfeiture). 
109 Search Results, WESTLAW NEXT, http://next.westlaw.com (search for “civil forfeiture,” 
then select “Cases” in the “View” menu and “Last three months” in the “Date” menu) (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2015).  
110 No. 12-1279-18, 2013 WL 5462320, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2013) (concerning the forfeiture 
of two million dollars in relation to money laundering). 
111 No. 12-423, 2013 WL 5755044, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 23, 2013) (concerning the forfeiture of 
a Porsche purchased with fraudulent proceeds).  
112 No. 07-1587, 2013 WL 486278, *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013) (concerning the forfeiture of less 
than $4,000 in jewelry).  
113 No. 12-720, 2013 WL 6440508, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 9, 2013) (concering the forfeiture of 
a Jeep Cherokee in relation to a drug transaction).  
114 Radley Balko, Under Asset Forfeiture Law, Wisconsin Cops Confiscate Families’ Bail Money, 
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/20/asset-forfeiture-wisconsin-bail-
confiscated_n_1522328.html (last updated May 21, 2012, 2:53 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/FZ 
W2-DWLP. Many commentators have sounded the alarm that the current economic incentive 
structure essentially renders forfeitures of LVC and MVC immune to accountability. See, e.g., 
Karis Ann-Yu Chi, Comment, Follow the Money: Getting to the Root of the Problem with Civil Asset 
Forfeiture in California, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1635, 1642 (2002) (“Some defense attorneys . . . will not 
accept a case unless the forfeiture value is large. The expense may discourage contests. For 
example, it would not be economical to spend $10,000 in attorney’s fees to contest the forfeiture of 
a $5,000 car.”); Randy Balko, Tennessee Asset Forfeiture Bill Seeks to Abolish Abusive Police Practice, 
HUFFINGTON POST (last updated Mar. 22, 2013, 3:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
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The challenge, then, is to design a system that can adequately protect 
against the abuse of forfeiture as directed against MVC and LVC, while 
encouraging the lawful pursuit of forfeiture against real property and HVC.  
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
Forfeiture—hotly debated in the 1990s—is again assuming a place 
among the pressing legal issues of the day. As such, multiple groups have 
proposed different solutions for addressing the current national forfeiture 
landscape. Unfortunately, none of these solutions adequately addresses the 
general problems of civil forfeiture or the more specific problem of MVC 
and LVC forfeiture.  
A. Inaction 
Much of the current law enforcement establishment argues vociferously 
against any changes to civil forfeiture, through both public and political 
advocacy.115 The arguments in favor of maintaining the existing forfeiture 
system can be reduced to two components (1) that forfeiture is an effective 
mode of crime control and (2) that forfeiture provides benefits to law 
enforcement that makes them more effectively able to police drug crime. 
On the first point, law enforcement and prosecutors argue that civil 
forfeiture is an essential tool in their arsenal and ought not to be tampered 
with. Indeed, during the CAFRA hearings, the Director of the Department 
of Justice’s forfeiture program testified that “[a]sset forfeiture can be to 
modern law enforcement what air power is to modern warfare.”116 
Others have echoed this refrain. The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. 
Two Tracts of Real Property with Buildings, called forfeiture “[o]ne of the most 
potent weapons in the government’s war on drugs.”117 This is the case 
because, although low-level drug dealers are essentially fungible, the 
 
2013/03/22/tennessee-asset-forfeiture_n_2933246.html, archived at http://perma.cc/PK5S-2WWY 
(“People are also less likely to go to court to demand the return of smaller amounts of cash or 
property of lesser value—even if they’re innocent—because the cost of winning it back often 
exceeds its value.”); J. F., Fighting Crime Through Superior Steak, ECONOMIST (Oct. 15, 2013, 2:28 
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/10/asset-forfeiture, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4ZVY-P6VM (“This sounds as though federal investigators are taking poor 
people’s money and stuff so that friends of the Fulton County DA’s office can eat crab cakes in 
champagne sauce and enjoy a fancy Christmas party.”).  
115 For a discussion of the difficulty of changing civil forfeiture laws via the political process, 
see infra notes 255-258 and accompanying text.  
116 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 55 (citation omitted).  
117 998 F.2d 204, 213 (1993).  
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property used to make or distribute drugs is often expensive or difficult to 
attain; thus, seizing this property can be more effective in stopping drug 
distribution than seizing any individual dealer.118 Moreover, forfeiture sends 
an important message to criminals that “crime doesn’t pay,” and thus has the 
potential to act as a deterrent to individuals contemplating criminal activity.119 
Law enforcement advocates also argue that as forfeiture allows for more 
effective enforcement against drug criminals, it produces fringe benefits that 
further control crime. Scholars note that “[p]olice and prosecutors argue 
that 21 U.S.C. § 881 enables them to carry out ordinary law enforcement 
business and raise money at the same time—to do well by doing good.”120 
Relatedly, law enforcement groups maintain that forfeiture is critical to 
maintaining their bottom lines.121 Without such funds, law enforcement 
would be bereft of critical equipment and other materials needed to combat 
illegal drug distribution effectively.122 Numerous commentators note the 
reliance of law enforcement on forfeiture to provide their offices with 
equipment. For instance, FBI Special Agent Victor E. Hartman, in a 2001 
bulletin, remarked that “[a]sset forfeiture laws . . . allow law enforcement to 
use proceeds of certain seizures for equipment and other needs.”123 As 
Stillman recounts, not only is the cash from sold property leveraged to 
benefit the department, but police often directly repurpose the vehicles of 
drug dealers.124 
 
118 See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 44 (“When criminal prosecution sends a drug 
dealer to jail, a subordinate will most likely take his place, but seizing the means of production and 
other capital may shut down the trafficking business for good.”).  
119 Worrall, supra note 87, at 13 (explaining how forfeiture denies criminals the profits from 
their crimes).  
120 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 55; see also Alison Roberts Solomon, Drugs and Money: 
How Successful Is the Seizure and Forfeiture Program at Raising Revenue and Distributing Proceeds?, 42 
EMORY L.J. 1149, 1161 (1993) (“[T]he purposes of § 881 civil forfeiture include . . . denying drug 
dealers the proceeds of ill gotten gains.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Section 
881 was later reformed as CAFRA. See supra notes 35-43 (providing a more detailed discussion of 
CAFRA). 
121 See Worrall, supra note 87, at 14 (“The obvious advantage of asset forfeiture is its potential 
to boost an agency’s bottom line.”).  
122 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 629 (1989) (“[T]he Gov-
ernment has a pecuniary interest in forfeiture that goes beyond merely separating a criminal from 
his ill-gotten gains; that legitimate interest extends to recovering all forfeitable assets, for such 
assets are deposited in a Fund that supports law-enforcement efforts in a variety of important and 
useful ways.”).  
123 Victor E. Hartman, Implementing an Asset Forfeiture Program, 70 FBI LAW ENFORCE-
MENT BULL. 1, 2 (2001).  
124 Stillman, supra note 21, at 50 (“[Forfeiture] enables authorities to confiscate cash or prop-
erty obtained through illicit means, and, in many states, funnel the proceeds directly into the fight 
against crime.”). 
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The arguments are crafted pragmatically. In a U.S. Attorneys’ Bulletin, 
Craig Gaumer explained: “Federal civil forfeiture law is a prosecutor’s secret 
weapon, a valuable tool used to guarantee that wrongdoers do not reap the 
financial benefits of criminal activity or continue to use the tools of their illegal 
trade.”125 By contrast, many local officials are even blunter, acknowledging that 
forfeiture is simply essential to maintaining their operating budgets.126 
Law enforcement is thus intensely critical of restricting forfeiture, which 
it sees as both directly and indirectly aiding their ability to combat illegal 
drug distribution. Law enforcement agencies would be loath to see their 
“most favored weapon” neutered.127 Accordingly, law enforcement groups 
such as Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) point out that the 
benefits of forfeiture outweigh the negatives and conclude that “it is 
difficult to fault financially strapped law enforcement agencies for seeking 
resources to continue their crime-fighting efforts.”128  
Many of these agencies claim that outrage over forfeiture abuse 
misunderstands the practice.129 Therefore, many organizations attempt 
to communicate the benefits of civil forfeiture to their communities 
through education and outreach programs.130 
Despite the vehement opposition of law enforcement agencies and some 
federal officials, the current pernicious use of forfeiture is out of control.131 
 
125 Craig Gaumer, A Prosecutor’s Secret Weapon: Federal Civil Forfeiture Law, 55 U.S. ATTYS’ 
BULL. 59, 59 (2007). 
126 See Stillman, supra note 21, at 50 (quoting Steve Westbrook, the Executive Director of the 
Sheriff ’s Association of Texas, as saying: “We all know the way things are right now—budgets are 
tight . . . . [Forfeiture is] definitely a valuable asset to law enforcement, for purchasing equipment 
and getting things you normally wouldn’t be able to get to fight crime.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
127 M. Lynette Eaddy, How Much is Too Much? Civil Forfeitures and the Excessive Fines Clause 
After Austin v. United States, 45 FLA. L. REV. 709, 711 (1993) (“In its ongoing war against drugs, 
civil forfeiture has perhaps been the federal government’s most favored weapon.”).  
128 Worrall, supra note 87, at 29.  
129 See id. at 28 (“The ‘Possible Criticisms and Negative Consequences’ section . . . may give 
the impression that forfeiture’s negatives outweigh its positives. Nothing could be further from the 
truth.”); see also Shaila Dewan, Police Departments Use Wish List When Deciding Which Assets to Seize, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2014, at A12 (“In defense of the practice, Gary Bergman, a prosecutor with 
the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council of Georgia, said civil forfeiture had been distorted in news 
reports.”).  
130 See Weber, supra note 91, at 1 (defining one of the goals of the “Strategic Plan” as 
“[c]ommunicat[ing] the benefits and accomplishments of the [Asset Forfeiture] Program to law 
enforcement leadership, government leaders, and the American public”).  
131 See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text (describing the abuse and underreporting of 
MVC or LVC forfeiture often due to the financial incentives police have to pursue such forfeiture 
and noting that the property is not valuable enough to merit a defense); see also infra notes 149-151 
and accompanying text (detailing the use of waivers in forfeiture proceedings to avoid contestation 
 
  
2015] Civil Forfeiture Reform 893 
As such, simply maintaining the status quo or promoting public education 
of the benefits of forfeiture programs is insufficient to solve any of the 
problems associated with forfeiture.  
B.  Expanding Constitutional Defenses  
Expanding constitutional defenses is a problematic proposition, as the 
property is the defendant in forfeiture actions, with the owner standing as a 
third party claimant.132 Hence, the property is relatively unprotected by the 
Constitution, as “few of the constitutional safeguards imposed on criminal 
prosecutions apply [in civil actions against property].”133 In forfeiture 
proceedings, there is no presumption of innocence,134 no right to attorney 
representation,135 and no hearsay objection.136  
However, the major difficulty with expanding constitutional defenses is—
as noted previously—that most MVC and LVC simply are not economically 
valuable enough to merit a defense, absent a blanket right to counsel.137 
Although constitutional doctrines may apply, any application will in effect 
never be tested because these cases are simply not litigated.  
 
in forfeiture cases); infra notes 181-183 and accompanying text (explaining how the perverse 
incentives behind forfeiture result in poor or corrupt policing).  
132 Cf. United States v. Certain Real Prop. at 317 Nick Fitchard Rd., 579 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th 
Cir. 2009) (naming the three claimants in the action); Claudio Riedi, Comment, To Shift or to 
Shaft: Attorney Fees for Prevailing Claimants in Civil Forfeiture Suits, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 147, 156 
(1992) (“[T]he claimant must prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence to be entitled to 
the return of her property.”).  
133 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 47-48.  
134 See, e.g., Leyh v. Prop. Clerk of City of N.Y. Police Dep’t, 774 F. Supp. 742, 746 (E.D.N.Y. 
1991) (“As noted above, the ‘presumption of innocence’ is inapplicable to a non-criminal proceed-
ing such as the civil forfeiture action.”); Nkechi Taifa, Civil Forfeiture vs. Civil Liberties, 39 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 95, 97 (1994) (“While human defendants enjoy a presumption of inno-
cence . . . inanimate defendants in forfeiture actions are presumed guilty based upon probable 
cause that they have been used in the commission of a crime.”). 
135 United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995) (declining to 
extend a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the forfeiture context because the proceeding was 
not criminal).  
136 United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 480-82 (1896) (holding that the right to confront 
adverse witnesses does not apply in forfeiture proceedings). 
137 See supra note 112 and accompanying text (comparing attorneys’ fees with the average 
property seized in civil forfeiture and noting the troubling difference in value).  
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1. Double Jeopardy 
Under the traditional view, espoused in Ursery v. United States, double 
jeopardy does not apply to civil forfeiture because it is not punishment in 
the traditional sense.138  
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: “[N]or shall any person be subject 
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”139 The 
clause prohibits subjecting a defendant to successive trials and successive 
punishments for the same offense.140 In Ursery, however, the Court over-
ruled both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, which had held that civil forfeiture 
constituted punishment in the context of double jeopardy.141 
The distinction between civil and criminal proceedings was central to the 
Court’s analysis in Ursery. By holding that forfeiture was not punishment, 
the Court signaled that forfeiture lay beyond the purview of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
This distinction between civil forfeiture and criminal punishment reaches 
its ne plus ultra in cases like United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 
which hold that even acquittal in an underlying criminal case does not 
preclude an in rem forfeiture action against associated property.142 The 
Court will apply the Double Jeopardy Clause only when the statutory 
provision turns the “civil trial into a criminal one.”143 
The Court’s analysis is problematic on several levels. As many point out, 
this standard will effectively never provide double jeopardy protection in 
civil forfeiture.144 Troublingly, the Court’s rationale explicitly depends on 
 
138 518 U.S. 267, 270-71 (1996) (“These civil forfeitures (and civil forfeitures generally), we 
hold, do not constitute ‘punishment’ for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”).  
139 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
140 U.S. v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (“This protection applies both to successive 
punishments and to successive prosecutions for the same criminal offense.”). 
141 Ursery, 518 U.S. at 274 (“[T]his Court has considered the application of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause to civil forfeitures, consistently concluding that the Clause does not apply to such 
actions because they do not impose punishment.”).  
142 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984) (“We hold that a gun owner’s acquittal on criminal charges 
involving firearms does not preclude a subsequent in rem forfeiture proceeding against those 
firearms.”).  
143 Susan R. Klein, Civil In Rem Forfeiture and Double Jeopardy, 82 IOWA L. REV. 183, 234 
(1996); see also 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 362 (“Unless the forfeiture sanction was intended as 
punishment, so that the proceeding is essentially criminal in character, the Double Jeopardy 
Clause is not applicable.”).  
144 Klein, supra note 143, at 229, notes that this bar is so high it can almost never be met. 
Indeed, it is often only met in the context of deportation or juvenile proceedings. Id.; see also, e.g., 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165-66 (1963) (“Congress has plainly employed the 
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the historical justification for forfeiture, which is no longer applicable.145 The 
Court has also set up different standards of “punishment” in its forfeiture 
cases for purposes of comparing Fifth Amendment analysis with Eighth 
Amendment analysis.146 
The central problem is the Court’s normative focus on the successive 
punishment, rather than successive prosecution, rationale for double 
jeopardy.147 In practice, prosecutors who fail in criminal trials will often bring 
forfeiture proceedings to get a “second bite at the apple” with a lower standard 
of proof.148 These actions are just like sequential criminal proceedings, and 
commentators urge that they be treated accordingly by extending double 
jeopardy protection to forfeiture actions.149  
Although double jeopardy analysis could conceivably provide a frame-
work to protect forfeiture claimants, such a result is unlikely for two 
reasons. First, the application of double jeopardy to forfeiture proceedings 
could undermine the “legal fiction” of forfeiture, which the Court has thus 
far been loath to abandon. Second, many civil forfeiture actions are brought 
without a parallel criminal action, thus evading any sort of double jeopardy 
protection altogether.  
On the first ground, it is unlikely that the Court would extend double 
jeopardy protection to forfeiture actions because an admission of the 
applicability of double jeopardy would directly contravene the central 
 
sanction of deprivation of nationality as a punishment . . . without affording the procedural 
safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.”). 
145 Ursery, 518 U.S. at 282 (explaining that the historical rationale behind forfeiture was cen-
tral to understanding the distinction between civil and criminal penalties). Justice Stevens, in his 
dissent in the case, noted that a continued reliance on forfeiture’s historical in rem roots may be 
inappropriate. Id. at 301 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (calling the historical fiction of treating forfeiture 
as an in rem proceeding only against property “fanciful”).  
146 Compare United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 333 (1998) (describing the forfeiture as 
punitive because the government proceeded directly against Bajakajian in personam rather than 
against his currency in rem), with Ursery, 518 U.S. at 278 (“In rem civil forfeiture is a remedial civil 
sanction, distinct from potentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as fines, and does not 
constitute a punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause.”). However, language in Bajakajian 
indicates that the historical “guilty property” legal fiction continues to undergird the Court’s 
analysis: “Acceptance of the Government’s argument would require us to expand the traditional 
understanding of instrumentality forfeitures. This we decline to do. Instrumentalities historically 
have been treated as a form of ‘guilty property’ that can be forfeited in civil in rem proceedings.” 
524 U.S. at 333.  
147 Klein, supra note 143, at 265 (“These abusive parallel civil in rem forfeiture and criminal 
proceedings should be barred under the successive prosecution prong of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.”). 
148 Id. at 259.  
149 See id. (suggesting that because prosecutors can punish defendants through civil actions, 
forfeiture actions should be considered among those actions that the Double Jeopardy Clause was 
designed to prohibit).  
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conceit of forfeiture, namely that forfeiture is an action against the res, 
rather than against the offender.150 Throughout the twentieth and into the 
twenty-first century, the Court has continually clung to this historic 
rationale for forfeiture.151 Because the Court has maintained this artificial 
distinction as necessary to preserve the edifice of forfeiture in spite of 
significant pressure for reform,152 double jeopardy protection is unlikely.  
The second ground is more troubling because, in many forfeiture cases, 
double jeopardy will simply not apply. Consider two alternative scenarios: 
the case of the Adams family153 and the case of the Caswell family.154 The 
owners of the property had not been charged with any wrongdoing in either 
situation, but authorities seized each family’s belongings simply because it 
was connected to illegal behavior on the premises.155 Double jeopardy is 
completely inapplicable in both instances because no action against the 
property or owners was possible except for the forfeiture action.156 Similarly, 
in the case of Willie Jones, double jeopardy would not protect Mr. Jones, 
who was not accused of any criminal wrongdoing, but was nonetheless 
forced to forfeit his cash.157 
 
150 See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363 (1984) (not-
ing that the forfeiture is filed against the res); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 
U.S. 663, 684 (1974) (describing the roots of forfeiture as an in rem action).  
151 See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 686 (“[W]hether the reason for [the forfeiture] be artificial 
or real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now 
displaced.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
152 See, e.g., supra notes 120-128 (detailing various theories recommending the extension of 
double jeopardy protections to forfeiture actions). 
153 See Stillman, supra note 21, at 51-52 (describing the forfeiture of the Adams’ home based 
on a minor drug deal in which the Adams’ son was involved on the porch of the family home). 
154 See Press Release, Inst. for Justice, IJ Scores Major Federal Court Victory in Massachussets 
Civil Forfeiture Case ( Jan. 24, 2013), available at http://ij.org/massachusetts-civil-forfeiture-release-
1-24-2013 (relaying the court victory for the Caswell family, which contested the federal seizure of 
their hotel for “facilitat[ing]” drug crimes by guests).  
155 In the case of the Adams family, Philadelphia officials sought the forfeiture of the family 
home because their son sold twenty dollars worth of marijuana to a confidential informant. 
Stillman, supra note 21, at 51-52. Similarly, federal officials sought the forfeiture of the Caswell’s 
hotel because Mr. Caswell “facilitated” drug crimes by having guests use drugs in his rooms. None 
of Mr. Caswell’s measures—installing security cameras and bright lights and allowing police free 
rooms for drug busts—stopped the seizure, although he subsequently prevailed in his federal case. 
Russ Caswell, Congress Must Protect Americans from ‘Policing for Profit’: Motel Owner Lives Through ‘Civil 
Forfeiture’ Horror Story, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/ 
feb/9/caswell-the-covetous-cops-of-motel-caswell/?, archived at http://perma.cc/W4HD-W36P.  
156 See United States v. 434 Main St., 961 F. Supp. 2d. 298, 302-03 (D. Mass. 2013) (“There is 
no contention in this case that anyone from the Caswell family has been involved in any criminal 
activity either at the Motel or elsewhere. It is undisputed that they are a law-abiding family. Mr. 
Caswell testified that he had never been charged with any crime in his life.”).  
157 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.  
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Thus, even in the unlikely event that double jeopardy were extended to 
the civil forfeiture context, the doctrine would act perversely to protect 
those who had been convicted of criminal offenses, rather than innocent 
owners who had their property seized because of its probable connection to 
illegal activity.  
2. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and  
Fourteenth Amendments 
Due process was one of the explicit concerns underlying CAFRA. 
Representative Henry Hyde, sponsor of CAFRA, openly recognized that 
“[d]ue process is overdue for some protection.”158 Forfeiture implicates 
multiple due process issues, three of which are discussed here.  
First, forfeiture implicates procedural due process concerns about court 
access. The Court and CAFRA have both largely addressed this issue. In 
James Daniel Good, the Court held that the Due Process Clause protected 
owners from having their real property seized by the government without 
being afforded the right to be heard in court.159 This decision brought real 
property forfeiture squarely within the ambit of procedural due process 
protection.160 The Court has also drawn links between the right to own 
property in a community and the right of access to its courts, finding the 
two implicitly related: “[t]he right of a citizen to defend his property 
against attack in a court is corollary to the plaintiff ’s right to sue there.”161 
CAFRA has also picked up the torch, requiring notice for seizures of real 
property.162  
Unfortunately, although James Daniel Good extended procedural due 
process protection to real property forfeiture,163 it is unlikely that such 
protection would ever extend to MVC or LVC. Indeed, the Court in James 
 
158 Rep. Henry Hyde, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm., Forfeiture Reform: Now or Nev-
er?, Remarks at the Cato Institute (May 3, 1999), available at https://www.aclu.org/technology-
and-liberty/statement-rep-henry-hyde-forfeiture-reform-now-or-never. 
159 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993) (“[T]he Due Pro-
cess Clause requires the Government to afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 
before seizing real property subject to civil forfeiture.”).  
160 See Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick, and Profitable Also be Fair? Runaway 
Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1994) (describing the 
James Daniel Good ruling as ensuring due process protection in forfeiture cases). 
161 Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 828 (1996); see also Fishburn, supra note 106, at 13 
(describing the Degen holding as extending some minimal due process protections to civil 
forfeiture).  
162 See 18 U.S.C. § 985(c)(1) (2012) (describing the required process for forfeiture of real 
property).  
163 510 U.S. at 62.  
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Daniel Good explicitly held that the due process protections afforded to the 
defendant in that case would not apply to chattel.164 
The Court’s reasoning depended heavily on a test laid out in Mathews v. 
Eldridge.165 The Mathews test determines when “extraordinary circumstances” 
exist to excuse the requirement of pre-hearing notice.166 The three Mathews 
factors—(1) the nature of the private interest at stake, (2) the risk of error 
associated with the procedure used, and (3) the government’s interest, 
including the administrative burden of a more elaborate procedure167—
weigh heavily against extending procedural due process protection to MVC 
and LVC.168 
The third factor proves the most directly problematic for chattel. In 
James Daniel Good, the Court found critical the fact that the real property 
could not be removed from the seizing court’s jurisdiction pending the 
hearing.169 The Court contrasted Calero-Toledo,170 and insinuated that pre-
forfeiture notice for chattel is almost never appropriate, recognizing the 
importance of immediate seizure to maintaining a court’s jurisdiction over 
movable property.171  
This statutory framework has been used to provide forfeiture protection 
for automobiles. In Krimstock v. Kelly, the Second Circuit applied the 
Mathews factors to a New York statute that provided for the forfeiture of 
automobiles.172 Then-Judge Sotomayor considered the deprivation of the 
claimant’s vehicle, which she noted was significant due to the centrality of a 
vehicle to an individual’s ability to earn a living.173 She weighed this against 
the State’s interest in keeping potentially forfeitable property safe from 
 
164 Id. at 57 (explaining the difference between the seizure of real property and chattel).  
165 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  
166 James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 53-54; see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (noting that due 
process is a flexible concept and depends on the context).  
167 Mathews, 424 U.S at 335; see also Chi, supra note 114, at 1644 (explaining the Mathews 
factors and their application to chattel vis-à-vis real property). 
168 See Chi, supra note 114, at 1644 (“[A] mobile object can easily move out of the court’s 
jurisdiction and would do so unless seized immediately, without delays that may result from notice 
and hearing.”).  
169 See 510 U.S. at 57 (“[R]eal property cannot abscond.”). 
170 416 U.S. 663 (1974).  
171 James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 57 (“First, immediate seizure was necessary to establish the 
court’s jurisdiction over the property, and second, the yacht might have disappeared had the 
Government given advance warning of the forfeiture action.” (citation omitted)).  
172 306 F.3d 40, 60-68 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that the district court applied the Mathews 
balancing test to determine what procedural safeguards would be appropriate in this case).  
173 Id. at 61 (“The particular importance of motor vehicles derives from their use as a mode 
of transportation and, for some, the means to earn a livelihood.”).  
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destruction or sale.174 Finally, Judge Sotomayor noted that the city’s pre-
seizure procedures did not adequately protect against the erroneous depri-
vation of an interest.175 As such, Judge Sotomayor found that the Mathews 
test required due process protections for automobiles, including swift 
hearings after their seizure.176 
Although Judge Sotomayor’s opinion provides some hope for expanding 
procedural due process protection to chattel, it is unlikely this would help 
protect MVC or LVC for two reasons. First, key to the first component of 
the Mathews test was the fact that vehicles are so central to their owners and 
are often the lynchpin of their livelihoods.177 The same cannot be said of 
MVC or LVC, which often consist of personal property, jewelry, or petty 
cash, which do not bear as directly on an individual’s ability to earn a living. 
Second, in Krimstock, Judge Sotomayor continued to rely on the fact that the 
vehicles at issue—cars seized pursuant to a DUI arrest—were already in the 
State’s possession and thus immovable, unlike the yacht in Calero-Toledo.178 
Again, this offers little help for protecting MVC or LVC, which are usually 
eminently transportable.  
Mobility is a concern because the central notion of forfeiture depends on 
the res actually being before the court.179 Thus, since any form of chattel—no 
matter how valuable—can be removed from the seizing court’s jurisdiction 
pending a hearing, courts are unlikely to extend procedural due process 
protection to MVC or LVC.180 
Civil forfeiture also invokes a substantive due process issue: impartiality. 
Indeed, impartiality is essential to justice, and the principle is embedded in 
the due process guarantee. The Court has found the right abridged whenever 
a conflict exists that could “offer a possible temptation to the average man as 
a judge . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.”181 
 
174 Id. at 64.  
175 Id. at 62-63.  
176 Id. at 70.  
177 Id. at 61 (“A car or truck is often central to a person’s livelihood or daily activities. An 
individual must be permitted to challenge the City’s continued possession of his or her vehicle.”).  
178 Id. at 65 (“The critical difference between Calero-Toledo and the present case is that plain-
tiffs’ vehicles have already been seized and are in the hands of the police. Just as with real property 
seized by the government in forfeiture proceedings, there is no danger that these vehicles will 
abscond.”).  
179 See United States v. James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. 43, 57 (1993) (“It is true that seizure of 
the res has long been considered a prerequisite to the initiation of in rem forfeiture proceedings.”). 
180 See Chi, supra note 114, at 1644 (“Application of [the Mathews] factors has resulted in 
exceptions in almost all cases involving personal property.”).  
181 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927); see also Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 57 
(“Impartiality is inseparable from justice.”).  
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The Court, in Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., created a problematic precedent for 
those seeking to extend the conflict of interest doctrine into the forfeiture 
context.182 In Jerrico, the defendant, a restaurant management company, 
challenged a provision in the Fair Labor Standards Act requiring the return of 
fines to the enforcing agency to defray the costs of enforcement.183 The 
defendant argued that “this provision created an impermissible risk and 
appearance of bias by encouraging the assistant regional administrator to make 
unduly numerous and large assessments of civil penalties.”184 
The Court, however, after restating the principle that “[t]he Due Process 
Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in 
both civil and criminal cases,” found for the government.185 The Court 
distinguished previous impartiality cases—including, most centrally, Tumey 
v. Ohio186—and held that the remuneration provision did not create imper-
missible bias. The Court distinguished Tumey on the basis that, in Jerrico, no 
official’s salary depended directly on the level of fines and the fines amounted 
to less than one percent of the Employment Standards Administration’s 
annual budget.187 
From Jerrico, we can coalesce three concerns that determine impartiality: 
financial dependence, personal interest, and funding formulas.188 Importantly, 
the Court has drawn a sharp distinction between prosecutorial and judicial 
impartiality.189  
Despite this distinction, it seems clear that an application of the three 
Jerrico factors to forfeiture could find that forfeiture impinges on impartiality. 
Although personal interest on the prosecutors’ part may be lacking, as 
discussed infra, prosecutors and police have a marked pecuniary interest in 
 
182 446 U.S. 238 (1980).  
183 Id. at 240-41.  
184 Id. at 241.  
185 Id. at 242.  
186 273 U.S. 510 (1927).  
187 Jerrico, 446 U.S. at 247 (relying on the fact that the administrator at issue in Jerrico did not 
exercise anything like the judicial discretion seen in Tumey). The one percent of funding distinc-
tion was also important to the Court’s decision: “Nor is there a realistic possibility that the 
assistant regional administrator’s judgment will be distorted by the prospect of institutional 
gain. . . . [T]he civil penalties collected . . . represent substantially less that 1% of the budget of the 
ESA.” Id. at 250.  
188 Id. at 247-51; see also Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 61-62 (listing succinctly the 
three Jerrico factors).  
189 Jerrico, 466 U.S. at 248 (“The rigid requirements of Tumey and Ward, designed for offi-
cials performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions, are not applicable to those acting in a 
prosecutorial or plaintiff-like capacity.”).  
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high levels of forfeiture.190 Moreover, the distinction may be artificial: “the 
Court’s sharp distinction between judicial and prosecutorial standards is 
controversial and belies the overwhelmingly dispositive role of discretionary 
prosecutorial decisions in a system where few cases ever go to trial.”191  
But even accepting arguendo the Jerrico distinction, its application to civil 
forfeiture is tenuous. The actions of police and prosecutors seeking forfei-
ture are substantively different than that of the ESA in Jerrico. Indeed, 
unlike the ESA, police agencies use violent and dangerous tactics, which 
threaten liberty and life in ways not contemplated in Jerrico.192  
Substantive due process protection in the form of impartiality require-
ments unfortunately does not also hold out much hope for protecting MVC 
and LVC. As noted, the Court in Jerrico repeatedly distinguished between 
adjudicative officials and prosecutors, noting that prosecutors need not 
remain “neutral and detached.”193 In an adversarial system, the courts 
strive to maintain incentives for prosecutors to zealously pursue justice.194 
Although the distorted profit mechanisms of civil forfeiture have led many 
to be disturbed by conflicts of interest, the Court has yet to step over the 
formalistic prosecutor–adjudicator divide to examine the real and looming 
conflict of interest. 
Finally, due process is implicated in the disturbing use of waivers in 
forfeiture. Although this issue is difficult to quantify as substantive or 
procedural, elements of both underpin this concern. 
Essentially, using waivers in forfeiture allows police departments to 
completely bypass the judicial system. Police departments entice individuals 
to sign away their rights to property via waiver in exchange for non-
prosecution for some related offense. In Florida, Delane Johnson was 
 
190 See supra notes 81, 221-224 and accompanying text (describing the perverse incentives set 
up under the forfeiture system, which allows police and prosecutors to retain seized funds and 
property); see also Blumenson & /Nilsen, supra note 33, at 69 (“One Department of Justice manual 
governing racketeering prosecutions, for example, suggests that prosecution may be contingent on 
the presence of forfeitable assets, rather than forfeiture being an incident of prosecution.”); 
Stillman, supra note 21, at 61 (detailing how the District Attorney of Tenaha, Texas, named in a 
class action suit filed by forfeiture targets, attempted to use forfeiture funds for her own defense).  
191 Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 69. 
192 It is important to compare the peaceful enforcement of the ESA in Jerrico with the some-
times-violent actions carried out to enforce forfeiture. In Jerrico, the ESA and defendant Jerrico 
contested the matter peaceably, resorting to the Court. By contrast, law enforcement officers often 
carry out forfeiture with great violence. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing the 
violent death of Donald Scott at the hands of officials seeking the forfeiture of his ranch).  
193 466 U.S. at 248 (citation omitted).  
194 See id. at 248-49 (“The constitutional interests in accurate finding of facts and application 
at law, and in preserving a fair and open process for decision are not to the same degree implicated 
if it is the prosecutor, and not the judge, who is offered an incentive for securing civil penalties.”). 
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required to sign away his property to avoid trial for another criminal 
charge.195 Similarly, in Tenaha, Texas, prosecutors and police frequently 
threatened motorists with aggressive, felony drug charges if motorists would 
not agree to forfeit their property.196 The use of these waivers should be 
invalidated under any theory of due process, since “[t]he use of asset-
forfeiture waivers deprives property owners of due process because there are 
no forfeiture proceedings.”197 
Thus, although due process should unequivocally eliminate some forfei-
ture programs—like the use of waivers in chattel seizure—it is unlikely to 
extend much real protection to MVC or LVC.  
3. Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment 
When asset forfeiture is partly punitive, it is subject to an excessive fines 
analysis.198 The appropriate inquiry under this Eighth Amendment analysis 
is whether the forfeiture is “grossly disproportional to the offense.”199 Con-
gress explicitly approved this standard in CAFRA by requiring the claimant 
to prove that the forfeiture was “grossly disproportional.”200 
Unfortunately, there are two problems with this approach. The first is 
that lower courts selectively apply it, often distinguishing “proceeds” 
forfeiture from other types of forfeiture and refusing to undertake an 
Eighth Amendment analysis.201 For instance, the Fifth Circuit, in United 
 
195 See Eric Moores, Comment, Reforming the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 51 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 777, 795-97 (2009) (describing how Florida police used a “Contraband Forfeiture Agree-
ment” to induce Mr. Johnson to forfeit his property in exchange for not pursuing potential charges 
against him). The practice was later found unconscionable and public pressure halted the program. 
Id. at 796.  
196 See Stillman, supra note 21, at 54 (recounting the story of Jennifer Boatright, who was 
threatened with criminal prosecution and the removal of her children to foster care if she did not 
sign a waiver forfeiting her property to Tenaha).  
197 Moores, supra note 195, at 797. Moores is appropriately alarmed that the practice “invites 
deceit” since fearful property owners simply sign away their rights rather than contest the 
forfeiture. Id. 
198 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993); see also Alexander v. United States, 
509 U.S. 544, 558-59 (1993) (finding that forfeiture is no different from a monetary fine and thus 
subject to Eighth Amendment analysis).  
199 18 U.S.C. § 983(g)(4) (2012); see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) 
(holding that the appropriate inquiry is whether the forfeiture is “grossly disproportional to the 
gravity of a defendant’s offense”).  
200 18 U.S.C. § 983(g)(3)-(4) (2012).  
201 See Amanda Seals Bersinger, Note, Grossly Disproportional to Whose Offense? Why the 
(Mis)application of Constitutional Jurisprudence on Proceeds Forfeiture Matters, 45 GA. L. REV. 841, 861 
(2011) (“Circuit courts disagree as to whether the forfeiture of proceeds gained from a criminal 
enterprise is necessarily punitive.”).  
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States v. Betancourt, held that criminal proceeds forfeiture can never be 
considered punitive.202 Courts consequently bifurcate the inquiry, asking 
both whether the forfeiture is punitive and whether it is disproportionate.203 
Problematically, many lower courts often “answer the first question with the 
second,” confusing the question altogether.204  
Establishing how “disproportionate” the forfeiture must be empirically 
increases the difficulty of the determination. Some courts have held that 
proportionality should be judged according to the gravity of the individual’s 
offense. For instance, in United States v. Van Brocklin, the Eighth Circuit 
found that holding one codefendant liable for a $1.3 million forfeiture 
violated the Excessive Fines Clause because the codefendant’s role was 
“secondary” to that of her co-conspirators, and she received little personal 
benefit from the criminal activity.205 The Fourth Circuit, by contrast, has 
held that proportionality should be measured against the per se gravity of 
the criminal enterprise as a whole.206  
More difficult is determining exactly how “disproportional” the forfei-
ture must be empirically. One common technique is to refer to the statutory 
fines for a criminal offense and compare them to the value of forfeited 
property. In United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, the Eleventh Circuit 
upheld the forfeiture of a $70,000 piece of property because the statutory 
fine for the defendant’s four cocaine sales was over $1 million.207 If Congress has 
endorsed such a fine, the court reasoned, how could it be disproportionate?208 
However, this technique obscures the element of “disproportionality” 
that offends many. The issue is not the sheer value of the property, but the 
connectedness of the property to the crime. Indeed, this concern is rooted in 
the fiction of civil forfeiture itself, which depends on the idea of the guilty 
 
202 422 F.3d 240, 250 (5th Cir. 2005). 
203 See Bersinger, supra note 201, at 865-66 & n.171 (describing the two-prong Bajakajian 
test). 
204 Id. (“By finding that proceeds forfeiture is, as a matter of law . . . proportional, courts 
ignore the first prong of the Bajakajian analysis. Instead of determining whether a forfeiture is 
punitive and then whether it is excessive, courts answer the first question with the second.”); see 
also United States v. Black, 526 F. Supp. 2d 870, 885 n.10 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (finding that proceeds 
forfeiture is not disproportionate, and therefore not punitive, and noting that “[i]t is not that 
proceeds forfeitures are not subject to the Eighth Amendment, but rather that, as direct proceeds of 
a crime, they are not disproportionate to the offense”).  
205 115 F.3d. 587, 601-02 (8th Cir. 1997). 
206 See United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 418-19 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding the forfeiture 
despite the defendant’s relatively minor role in the conspiracy).  
207 175 F.3d 1304, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999). 
208 Id. at 1310-11 (“[T]he sentencing guidelines and the statute agree that a fine of up to 
$1,000,000 would be proportional to [defendant’s] crimes; consequently, the forfeiture of a $70,000 
property based on those crimes does not violate the Eighth Amendment.”). 
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res. Cases like that of Sarah Leino—who lost her home because her husband 
was charged with one count of possessing prescription drugs with intent to 
distribute—offend these common notions of proportionality.209  
Thus, one proposed solution for proportionality is that contemplated in 
United States v. Real Property Located at 6625 Zumirez Drive: an instrumentality–
proportionality test.210 Under this test, the court considers not just the value 
of the property against the fine, but also attempts to judge the instrumental-
ity of the property to the crime. Specifically, the test considers: “(1) the 
gravity of the offense compared with the harshness of the forfeiture; (2) 
whether the property was an integral part of the commission of the crime; 
and (3) whether the criminal activity involving the defendant property was 
extensive in terms of time and spatial use.”211 
Such a test better captures standard notions of justice, and looks to see 
just how closely the property was involved with the illicit conduct. Moreover, 
applying this test in the case of the Leino family would have yielded the 
right result—that of allowing Mrs. Leino and her children to remain in 
their home.  
The instrumentality–proportionality test of Zumirez does offer some 
potential relief for MVC and LVC. Most MVC and LVC would probably 
not be seen as sufficiently instrumental to drug crimes to pass the Zumirez 
test and would therefore qualify for forfeiture. Indeed, most of these items 
forfeited are personal items: jewelry, sneakers, or petty cash, and thus not 
“instrumental” to any drug offense.212 
Unfortunately, the Zumirez standard was generated by a district court 
and has not garnered widespread national favor because of its inherent 
 
209 See Isaiah Thompson, House Hunting, PHILA. CITY PAPER, Aug. 15, 2013, at 6, available at 
http://issuu.com/phillycp/docs/issuu_8_15_2013 (“Long before the forfeiture action against her house 
would be completed . . . Leino would be forced from her house and made homeless along with her three 
children.”); Radley Balko, Philadelphia Family Loses Home over a Single Drug Charge, HUFFINGTON POST, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/10/philadelphia-family-loses_n_3899905.html (last updated 
Sept. 10, 2013, 12:13 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/734T-BUQF (relaying the story of the Leino 
family, who lost its home after Sam Leino was witnessed handing small amounts of prescription 
pills in exchange for money “outside the house”).  
210 845 F. Supp. 725, 732 (C.D. Cal. 1994).  
211 Skorup, supra note 24, at 441; see also Zumirez, 845 F. Supp. at 732-34 (laying out the three 
factors Skorup cites).  
212 See, e.g., Shakedown in Tenaha, Texas, INST. FOR JUST., http://www.ij.org/about/ 
3nexium%20order/3192, archived at http://perma.cc/GC3U-WYZU (“Officers seized cash, cars, cell 
phones, jewelry and even sneakers.”); Stillman, supra note 21, at 49 (describing the Tenaha police 
station, in which two tables “were heaped with jewelry, DVD players, cell phones, and the like”). 
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subjectivity.213 Even worse, it appears that most MVC and LVC are forfeit-
ed under a “proceeds” theory, which knows no proportionality analysis.214 
Without this “instrumentality” analysis, the Excessive Fines Clause of 
the Eighth Amendment offers little hope for MVC and LVC. Indeed, the 
excessive fines clause and proportionality often cut the other way: expensive 
property is protected, while less valuable property is not. 
Under the current test espoused by both Bajakajian and CAFRA, MVC 
and LVC will remain unprotected. As Bajakajian reminds us, the appropriate 
inquiry is whether the forfeiture is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of 
[the] offense.”215 As such, it is highly unlikely that MVC and LVC—with a 
maximum value of $10,000—will receive any protection.  
Indeed, should the current disproportionality practice of comparing 
forfeiture values to fine amounts continue, there is no hope for protecting 
these types of property, as drug fines frequently run into the millions of dollars. 
For instance, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) provides for a maximum fine of $1 million for 
trafficking less than 500 grams of cocaine.216 This is a comparatively low fine; 
the same section provides for a fine of $10 million for an individual trafficking 
in PCP or crack, with fines of $50 million for syndicates.217 By comparison, 
most forfeited items—the average value of which is $650218—stand no chance of 
insulation under a purely monetary disproportionality standard. 
The resulting system is surely a perverse one, because “the small time 
dealer risks losing the same amount of property as the drug baron.”219 
Unfortunately, with the current state of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, 
the Excessive Fines Clause offers more protection to drug lords holding 
 
213 See, e.g., Kristen Michelle Caione, Note, When Does In Rem Civil Forfeiture Under 21 
U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) Constitute An Excessive Fine? An Overview and an Attempt to Set Forth a Uniform 
Standard, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1093, 1116-17 (1997) (noting that the Zumirez test—although 
admirable—is problematic because of its inherent subjectivity and the tendency of its prongs to 
yield conflicting results); Charmin Bortz Shiely, Note, United States v. Bajakajian: Will a New 
Standard for Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to Criminal Forfeitures Affect Civil Forfeiture Analysis?, 
77 N.C. L. REV. 1595, 1618 (1999) (noting that the Zumirez test has been superseded in the Ninth 
Circuit).  
214 See supra notes 154-156 (discussing the problematic doctrine of “proceeds forfeiture” and 
how it insulates forfeiture from any Eighth Amendment review).  
215 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998).  
216 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2012).  
217 Id. For a more straightforward view of the federal drug penalties, see BRIAN T. YEH, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30722, DRUG OFFENSES: MAXIMUM FINES AND TERMS OF 
IMPRISONMENT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT AND 
RELATED LAWS 1-3 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30722.pdf.  
218 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.  
219 Chet Little, Note, Civil Forfeiture and the Excessive Fines Clause: Does Bajakajian Provide 
False Hope for Drug-Related Offenders?, 11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 219 (2000).  
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valuable real estate than to common individuals facing the seizure of their 
personal chattel. 
C. Removing the Profit Motive from Civil Forfeiture 
Excising the profit motive from civil forfeiture is perhaps the most 
widely suggested reform. Although governments originally relied upon the 
profit motive to induce police departments to pursue forfeitures, allowing 
police to profit from forfeiture has led to widespread abuse. 
The IJ proposes that the government “[e]nd the direct profit incentive 
under civil forfeiture laws. Civil forfeiture revenue should be placed into a 
neutral fund, such as one for education or drug treatment, or, most desirably, 
in the general revenue fund of the county or state government.”220 
Giving individuals the opportunity for pecuniary gains in law enforce-
ment practice creates perverse incentives and potential for abuse.221 Indeed, 
reporters have uncovered atrocious tales of exploitation, from flashy cars,222 
to concert tickets,223 to popcorn machines.224  
Generally, allowing police departments to profit from forfeiture leads to 
an aggressive hunt for properties that might be subject to forfeiture. Such an 
approach led to the botched raid and death of Donald Scott.225 Indeed, it 
 
220 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 14; cf. Vanita Gupta, End Policing for Profit, ACLU 
(Apr. 12, 2010, 5:18 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/end-policing-profit, 
archived at http://perma.cc/HT6-XAUQ (“Rather than giving police and prosecutors a direct 
financial incentive to increase forfeitures, states and the federal government should put that money 
into a general, neutral fund, perhaps for education or drug treatment.”).  
221 See, e.g., Andrew Cohen, Is Anyone Not a Cop in Favor of “Civil Forfeiture” Laws?, BRENNAN 
CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/anyone-not-cop-favor-
%E2%80%9Ccivil-forfeiture%E2%80%9D-laws, archived at http://perma.cc/3AY3-WT9X (deeming 
it pure common sense that civil forfeiture laws create “perverse incentives”); Megan McArdle, How 
the Lone Star State Legalized Highway Robbery, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2013-08-07/how-the-lone-star-state-legalized-highway-robbery.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
U5XL-WBFE (“If you give people incentives to take things, then they probably will.”); Inst. for 
Justice, New Jersey Ex-Sheriff Fights Civil Forfeiture Abuse, PROGRESS REPORT (Dec. 26, 2002), 
http://www.progress.org/tpr/new-jersey-ex-sheriff-fights-civil-forfeiture-abuse/, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/KNP8-WY8D (describing New Jersey’s forfeiture program as “perverse”).  
222 Robyn E. Blumner, Police Are Addicted to Lure of Easy Money, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
Aug. 17, 2003, at 7D (recounting the use of flashy seized cars by the Tampa Police Department).  
223 Sibilla, DA’s Office in Georgia, supra note 107 (detailing the abuses of forfeiture in Georgia, 
including the purchase of CeeLo Green concert tickets). 
224 Stillman, supra note 21, at 58 (mentioning a nine-page spreadsheet listing items funded by 
Tenaha’s roadside seizures, including a popcorn machine).  
225 For a discussion of the botched raid on Scott’s ranch, see supra note 33 and accompanying 
text. The quest for profit initially drove the fatal raid on Scott’s ranch. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra 
note 33, at 73-74. They show that “as the Ventura County District Attorney’s report concluded, a 
purpose of this operation was to garner the proceeds from the forfeiture of Scott's $5 million 
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seems that the policy of maximizing profits in this way came from the 
highest level. A former head of the Justice Department’s Asset Forfeiture 
Section claims the department’s “marching orders” were: “Forfeit, forfeit, 
forfeit. Get money, get money, get money.”226 
Moreover, the profit motive has led to two other disturbing trends in law 
enforcement and forfeiture practice. The first is the “privatization” of civil 
forfeiture. In Oklahoma, a contracted private party, Desert Snow, conducted 
forfeitures along highways in exchange for ten to twenty-five percent of the 
proceeds.227 Public outrage eventually brought the program to a halt.228 
The profit motive also results in distorted policing practices. For instance, 
the “reverse sting” has become popular. In the reverse sting, police target 
buyers of drugs, rather than sellers, because buyers carry forfeitable cash, 
while sellers carry only drugs that must be destroyed if seized.229 The 
practice is extremely widespread. In Tennessee, for example, the highway 
patrol concentrated ninety percent of its enforcement efforts on seizing cash 
departing Nashville and only ten percent on the drugs entering Nashville.230 
Such procedures are clearly problematic, as they work counter to the stated 
objective of forfeiture: getting drugs off the streets. Moreover, such proce-
dures often lead to questionable seizures, such as the seizure of an elderly 
couple’s home in Philadelphia after their son completed a few minor 
marijuana transactions on the porch.231 
 
ranch.” Id. at 74. This concern continues today. See Dewan, supra note 121 (“[P]rofit motives can 
outweigh public safety.”). 
226 Cheh, supra note 160, at 4 (internal citations omitted). 
227 See David Blatt, Policing for Profit in Oklahoma, OKLA. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 26, 2013), http:// 
okpolicy.org/policing-for-profit-in-oklahoma, archived at http://perma.cc/Y2H-E3XU (describing 
the controversial program); Nolan Clay, Oklahoma DA Halts I-40 Drug Stops After Criticism, 
NEWSOK ( July 21, 2013), http://newsok.com/oklahoma-da-halts-i-40-drug-stops-after-criticism/ 
article/3864488, archived at http://perma.cc/CZ38-VVS3 (“After seizing more than $1 million in 
cash in drug stops this year, a district attorney has suspended further roadside busts by his task 
force because of growing criticism over a private company’s participation.”).  
228 Id. 
229 See, e.g., Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 67 (“The chief attraction of the reverse 
sting is that it allows police to seize a buyer’s cash rather than a seller’s drugs (which have no legal 
value to the seizing agency).”); Chi, supra note 114, at 1645-46 (detailing how the perverse 
incentive of profit in forfeiture is reflected in the “reverse sting”).  
230 NC5PhilWilliams, NewsChannel 5 Investigates: Policing for Profit, YOUTUBE ( J an. 15, 
2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TU_nh51FU14, archived at http://perma.cc/7EHL-EFPH 
(full report available at http://www.jrn.com/newschannel5/news/newschannel-5-investigates/policing- 
for-profit); cf. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 33, at 68 (noting that police have “a financial 
incentive to impose roadblocks on the southbound lanes of I-95, which carry the cash to make drug 
buys, rather than the northbound lanes, which carry the drugs. After all, seized cash will end up 
forfeited to the police department, while seized drugs can only be destroyed” (internal citation 
omitted)).  
231 See Stillman, supra note 21 (recounting the case of Mary and Leon Adams).  
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Proponents of abolishing the profit motive from civil forfeiture claim a 
plethora of benefits: not only will it clean up the distorted and damaging police 
practices resulting from pecuniary motivation, but departments will also 
consider more carefully whether to pursue certain forfeitures if they do not 
stand to gain. 
Unfortunately, removing the profit motive is far from a magic bullet 
where MVC and LVC are concerned. This Comment is not meant to 
disparage ending the profit motive as part of comprehensive forfeiture 
reform generally. I question instead how effective such a reform would be in 
reducing MVC and LVC forfeiture. Relatedly, removing the profit motive 
might severely decrease police budgets, hamstringing departments, or 
disincentivize the pursuit of the property of large-scale drug dealers.  
The first concern, specific to MVC and LVC, is that evidence shows that 
police disproportionately target minorities in forfeiture actions.232 Simply 
ending profit incentives might not therefore prevent seizures of the property 
of minorities, carried out simply to harass them.  
The ACLU described Texas forfeiture programs as “a regime of racial 
profiling.”233 Another ACLU report describes Texas law enforcement as 
specifically targeting minorities: “near the Mexican border, Hispanics allege 
that they are being singled out by local law enforcement.”234 Police officers 
testifying in a class action suit the ACLU filed in Tenaha, Texas, revealed 
that race played an explicit part of their calculus in pursuing forfeiture 
actions.235 Benson, Rasmussen, and Sollars reinforce this point, noting that 
some law enforcement agencies show a “desire . . . to control racial minori-
ties through the enforcement of such laws.”236 Representative Henry Hyde, 
 
232 Stillman, supra note 21, at 52 (quoting Louis Rulli, a clinical law professor at the Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania, as stating that “[f]or real-estate forfeitures, it’s overwhelmingly African-
Americans and Hispanics”); see also Dewan, supra note 121 (“Officials . . . mocked Hispanics whose 
cars were seized.”).  
233 Chloe Cockburn, Easy Money: Civil Asset Forfeiture Abuse by Police, ACLU (Feb. 3, 2010, 
1:16 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/easy-money-civil-asset-forfeiture-abuse-
police, archived at http://perma.cc/646K-VPKB.  
234 Chloe Cockburn, Texas Statute Paves Way for Highway Robbery, ACLU (Oct. 7, 2009, 4:24 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/texas-statute-paves-way-highway-robbery, archived at 
http://perma.cc/JM7H-44R7.  
235 Elora Mukherjee, Settlement Means No More Highway Robbery in Tenaha, Texas, ACLU 
(Aug. 9, 2012, 11:22 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform-racial-justice/settlement-
means-no-more-highway-robbery-tenaha-texas, archived at http://perma.cc/46XE-DZ33 (recording 
police officer testimony stating that “[t]he number one thing is you have two guys stopped, and 
these two guys are from New York. They’re two Puerto Ricans”).  
236 Bruce L. Benson, David W. Rasmussen & David L. Sollas, Police Bureaucracies, Their 
Incentives, and the War on Drugs, 83 PUB. CHOICE 21, 24 (1995).  
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in his book, also cites to a study finding that in more than five hundred stops 
involving forfeiture actions, over eighty percent had minority drivers.237 
It would appear that simply removing the profit motive from forfeiture 
might not work to totally remove the tool as one of racial harassment. 
Where a police officer maintains negative racial attitudes, he is likely to use 
forfeiture to target minority motorists aggressively, regardless of the 
eventual monetary outcome. The forfeiture—as a weapon of abuse—
becomes an end in itself. 
More generally, there is a concern that if the profit element of forfeiture 
were abolished, police departments would be caught in a massive budgetary 
crisis and would be unable to maintain other, valuable crime control activities. 
As the IJ notes, nearly forty percent of police departments depend on 
forfeiture for their budgets.238  
Stillman, who heard echoes of similar concerns in interviews, relays that 
many officers are concerned their departments “would collapse” if forfeiture 
practices become more heavily regulated.239 The COPS bulletin is quite 
explicit about the matter: “Though it is an enforcement tool, asset forfeiture 
can assist in the budgeting realm by helping to offset the costs associated 
with fighting crime.”240 Thus, there is a very real concern that if the profit 
motive were eliminated, other valuable law enforcement resources might 
likewise suffer, resulting in the scaling back of crime control. 
Finally, the profit motive can be influential in prodding police to pursue 
HVC or real property forfeiture they might otherwise avoid. It is intuitively 
important that, for instance, police seize the major properties of drug 
dealers—like the Escobar-owned condos in Miami241—or key instrumentalities 
of the drug trade, such as expensive cars or boats, used in transporting 
illegal drugs.242 Allowing some profit from forfeiture ensures that the police 
will assiduously check on the legal status of wealthy property owners, as 
well as impoverished ones. Unfortunately, current forfeiture statutes 
 
237 HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS: IS YOUR PROPERTY SAFE 
FROM SEIZURE? 38 (1995).  
238 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 12 (reporting that these agencies consider forfeiture 
a “necessary budget supplement”).  
239 Stillman, supra note 21, at 50.  
240 Worrall, supra note 87, at 2.  
241 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing the seizure of the Escobar properties 
and other successes of civil forfeiture).  
242 See Stillman, supra note 21, at 59 (describing how police repurpose key instrumentalities 
of the drug trade, like cars, in law enforcement activities); see also Blumner, supra note 222, at 7D 
(describing the Tampa Police Department’s use of seized cars).  
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incentivize the pursuit of MVC or LVC by giving police a higher portion of 
the profits from less valuable property.243 
Thus, although abolishing the profit motive would arguably eliminate 
much abuse of civil forfeiture, there are legitimate concerns that such a 
measure would wreak havoc on otherwise legitimate law enforcement 
measures, disincentivize the pursuit of key drug dealing instrumentalities, 
or simply fail to account for the racial bias of the enforcing officers. 
D. Abolishing Civil Forfeiture 
Abolishing civil forfeiture entirely is the most radical solution, although 
it garners support from both ends of the political spectrum. The political 
right tends to express concerns about forfeiture violating the sanctity of 
property rights.244 The political left, by contrast, considers police overreach, 
rights infringement, and racial bias in seizures alarming.245 
Many groups, including the IJ, formally advocate for a total ban on all 
civil forfeiture, although they often indicate that compromise solutions, 
such as those described above, may be required before total abolition.246 
Other commentators, however, express concern that further piecemeal 
reforms—akin to CAFRA—will only mask the problem, suggesting that “[a] 
categorical ban on civil asset forfeiture would be easier to administer than 
piecemeal reforms, and therefore more likely to succeed.”247 Most proponents 
of an absolute ban on civil forfeiture eschew action at the state level, which 
 
243 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 17.30.112(c) (West 2013) (providing that a court can 
award the police the seized property if its value is worth $5,000 or less).  
244 See, e.g., Tim Lynch, Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture, CATO INST. at 
07:20 (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.cato.org/multimedia/events/policing-profit-abuse-civil-asset-
forfeiture, archived at http://perma.cc/UDX5-LW6P (“[C]ivil forfeiture laws really create a trifecta 
of circumstances that place property rights at risk.”).  
245 See, e.g., Civil Asset Forfeiture, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/criminal-law-reform/civil-
asset-forfeiture, archived at http://perma.cc/9FXS-EEMV (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (“Asset 
forfeiture practices often go hand-in-hand with racial profiling and disproportionately impact low-
income African-American or Hispanic people who the police decide look suspicious.”).  
246 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 14 (“Ideally, civil forfeiture should be abolished, 
at least outside of its narrow historical use in enforcing admiralty and customs laws.”). 
247 Ilya Somin, New Yorker Article on Asset Forfeiture Abuse, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 5, 
2013, 4:31 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/08/05/new-yorker-article-on-asset-forfeiture-abuse, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7BRT-FU9H; see also Steve Clowney, New Yorker Article on Asset 
Forfeiture Abuse, PROPERTYPROF BLOG (Aug. 9, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/ 
property/2013/08/new-yorker-article-on-asset-forfeiture-abuse.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
MJ6M-ZSYZ (approving of Somin’s stance on forfeiture).  
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equitable sharing easily bypasses, and instead advocate for congressional 
action to reform the national forfeiture landscape in one sweeping stroke.248  
Although the solution is radical, some states have taken tentative steps 
that might eventually result in a total abolition of civil forfeiture. Indeed, 
North Carolina already lacks a civil forfeiture statute.249 Meanwhile, Ten-
nessee’s legislature recently introduced a bill that would entirely abolish 
forfeiture.250  
As attractive as such a solution may be, it is completely unfeasible for 
two reasons (1) damage to police budgets and (2) political infeasibility. As 
discussed above, forfeiture is critical to police budgeting.251 Thus, any major 
drawdown of forfeiture could cripple other important law enforcement 
efforts.  
Additionally, abolishing civil forfeiture is almost certainly politically 
infeasible. In fact, almost every legislative reform of forfeiture at the state 
level has been eviscerated. In California, for instance, a bill sponsored by 
Assemblyman Chris Norby attempted to close a loophole in equitable 
sharing.252 The bill, AB639, would have ended abuses of adoptive sharing by 
requiring a court order before an agency could transfer a forfeiture case to 
the federal government.253 After extensive lobbying by district attorneys and 
law enforcement groups, however, the bill died in the California Senate.254 
Similarly, in Tennessee, a bill proposed by Representative Barrett Rich, a 
former state trooper, proposed outlawing civil forfeiture entirely.255 However, 
the bill was completely rewritten in committee. As one of the sponsors of 
 
248 See, e.g., End Asset Forfeiture, DOWNSIZE DC, https://secure.downsizedc.org/etp/end-asset- 
forfeiture, archived at http://perma.cc/MHA2-4JVK (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (“Because the courts 
will not act to end civil asset forfeitures, Congress must. Another ‘compromise’ asset forfeiture bill 
will only lead to more abuses and outrages. Civil asset forfeiture must be abolished.”).  
249 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.  
250 See Nick Sibilla, Tennessee Bill Would Abolish Civil Forfeiture, INST. FOR JUSTICE, 
http://www.ij.org/tennessee-bill-would-abolish-civil-forfeiture, archived at http://perma.cc/WA8K-
BEFV (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (discussing a Tennessee bill aiming to “eliminate civil forfeiture 
in Tennessee”).  
251 See, e.g., WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 12 (reporting that forty percent of police 
departments depend on forfeiture to meet budgeting shortfalls).  
252 See Steven Greenhut, Why Asset Forfeiture Abuse Is on the Rise, REASON (Aug. 10, 2012), 
http://reason.com/archives/2012/08/10/why-asset-forfeiture-abuse-is-on-the-ris, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/LM32-ZSST (discussing AB639 and its failure to pass the legislature).  
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 See Sibilla, supra note 250 (describing the bill in Tennessee that would have dismantled 
the state’s forfeiture program).  
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the bill complained, “[i]n what is called an amendment, the entire wording 
of the bill . . . was literally deleted and new wording replaced it.”256 
Finally, in Utah, lawmakers recently passed a forfeiture bill that eviscer-
ated a reform passed in 2000. The law—pitched as a “recodification” of 
existing law—contains several troubling features: it gutted awards of 
attorneys’ fees to successful claimants, capping them at twenty percent of 
the value of the seized property; it reduced the deadline for prosecutors to 
file against the property from a sixty-day mandatory deadline to a ninety-day 
optional deadline; and it upheld the use of waivers in forfeiture actions.257 
Forfeiture reform bills often die because of extensive lobbying of law 
enforcement groups or prosecutors. For instance, California Bill AB639 
failed because the California District Attorney Association complained 
about the burden the bill would place on law enforcement, and the Los 
Angeles District Attorney opined that the bill’s only purpose was “to make 
it impossible for state/local law enforcement agencies [to] us[e] federal asset 
forfeiture procedures.”258 Similar concerns emerged during the debate on 
CAFRA, which meant that several proposed reforms were ultimately 
excluded from the final version of the bill.259 Finally, pressure from law 
enforcement groups, including the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, the North Carolina 
Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, and the U.S. Attorney 
General’s Office, led to the overturning of a 1988 amendment to North 
Carolina’s civil forfeiture statute.260 
 
256 See Eapen Thampy, Tennessee Lawmakers Gut Forfeiture Reform Proposal, Push for Ex Parte 
Determinations of Probable Cause, AMS. FOR FORFEITURE REFORM (Apr. 8, 2013), http:// 
www.forfeiturereform.com/2013/04/08/tennessee-lawmakers-gut-forfeiture-reform-proposal-push-
for-ex-parte-determinations-of-probable-cause/, archived at http://perma.cc/B3GS-RUD9 (quoting 
Hal Rounds, a co-author of the Tennessee bill frustrated at its evisceration).  
257 Jason Snead & Andrew Kloster, Utah’s New Law Helps Law Enforcement Nab Property of 
Innocent People, DAILY SIGNAL ( Jan. 21, 2014), http://dailysignal.com/2014/01/21/utah-reverses-
court-forfeiture-reforms-hopes-wont-notice/, archived at http://perma.cc/7EB9-WFKK (describing 
the provisions of the reforms and likely negative consequences); see also Nick Sibilla, Utah Made It 
Easier for Cops to Seize Innocent People’s Property. And Not A Single Lawmaker Voted Against It, 
FORBES (Dec. 23, 2013, 9:37 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2013/12/23/ 
utah-made-it-easier-for-cops-to-seize-innocent-peoples-property-and-not-a-single-lawmaker-
voted-against-it/, archived at http://perma.cc/YQ3A-V2UU (describing the troubling aspects of the 
Utah bill).  
258 Greenhut, supra note 252.  
259 See, e.g., Holcomb et al., supra note 70, at 275 (describing the power of law enforcement 
during the political process, including the fact that several provisions were inserted into CAFRA 
that actually “strengthened forfeiture powers in some circumstances”).  
260 Benson et al., supra note 236, at 30.  
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Thus, although abolishing civil forfeiture entirely would completely 
solve the problem, such a move is incredibly unlikely, both because of the 
collateral damage to police budgets, and because of the power of law 
enforcement in the political process.  
V. THE TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH 
In this Comment, I propose a transactional paradigm for reforming civil 
forfeiture. Although forfeiture actions lack many of the features of a 
transaction—most notably a voluntary exchange between parties—the 
application of economic insights to forfeiture reveals some new approaches 
to dealing with the problem of MVC and LVC forfeiture.261 Specifically, I 
construct a theoretical and practical framework that can provide for the ex 
ante protection of MVC and LVC by raising the costs of forfeiture actions 
to prevent these items from being seized in the first place.  
A. Some Insights from Economic Theory 
Several economic concepts are applicable to the forfeiture context. 
Although forfeiture actions provide a unique “form” of transaction, the 
analogy nevertheless applies and can help provide a valuable lens through 
which to conceptualize and understand civil forfeiture.  
1. Transaction Costs 
Before applying the following analyses, we must analytically define 
forfeiture as a transaction, despite the fact that it does not fall neatly into the 
conventional “transaction” paradigm. Textbook definitions of transactions 
tend to focus on the fact that transactions are typically voluntary exchanges 
between parties: “An agreement between a buyer and a seller to exchange 
goods, services or financial instruments.”262 
 
261 For most of this section, I use “forfeiture” and “seizure” interchangeably. As has been 
noted, the actions are legally distinct: police seize the item, followed by the actual forfeiture—a 
separate legal action transferring title. However, my concern was with increasing the costs of the 
seizure, as the low contest rates in forfeiture actions (eighty percent uncontested, see Oversight 
Committee, supra note 106, at 86) mean that the seizure and forfeiture actions often blend together. 
There is obviously more empirical work to be done here on top of the more ad hoc analysis I 
conducted supra in note 109 to determine the rate at which forfeiture is contested depending on 
the value of the chattel. Such work, unfortunately, is outside the scope of this Comment.  
262 Transaction Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/transaction.asp 
(last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4YH5-ER3Q.  
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Drawing insights from the Calabresi–Melamed and Coasean frame-
work,263 however, legal commentators have expanded their understanding of 
transactions. Specifically, the focus is less on the goods per se, and more on 
the entitlements underlying those goods. 
Calabresi–Melamed’s “property” and “liability” rules essentially relate to 
whether or not coercion may be used to obtain an entitlement. Theoretically, 
property rule protection prevents the transfer or destruction of entitlements 
without the consent of the owner.264 By contrast, liability rules “allow a 
would-be buyer to bypass the original entitlement holder’s consent and 
instead to take the entitlement through coercion.”265 
As such, we may understand civil forfeiture in the context of a “liability 
rule” transaction.266 Kontorovich is explicit on the matter: “Constitutional 
transactions . . . occur when the government condemns an entitlement 
through the judicial process.”267 We therefore must understand forfeiture as 
a transaction—one in which an entitlement (i.e., the ownership of MVC or 
LVC) is forcibly transferred to the government. 
Within this context, we then turn to the concept of “transaction costs.” 
For purposes of this Comment, I will define a transaction cost as anything 
that renders the transfer of rights more costly. Transaction costs can thus 
include tangible costs like search costs, or more intangible costs like 
inconvenience. Coase, in his seminal article The Problem of Social Cost, 
identified transaction costs as impacting the general level of transactions 
in a marketplace: “Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are 
taken into account it is clear that such a rearrangement of rights will only be 
 
263 See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (discussing the circum-
stances in which entitlements are granted); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & 
ECON. 1 (1960) (advocating for economic solutions to social problems that consider the complete 
effect of any entitlement granted).  
264 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 263, at 1092 (“An entitlement is protected by a property 
rule to the extent that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it 
from him in a voluntary transaction.”). 
265 Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost Analysis of 
Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1143 (2005). 
266 A more extensive application of forfeiture within the Calabresi–Melamed framework is 
beyond the scope of this Comment, as forfeiture poses complicated questions for that theory. Even 
though forfeiture may be understood as a forced transaction, it cannot be truly protected by a 
“liability rule” as understood by Calabresi–Melamed. This question will have to be explored more 
thoroughly in later scholarship.  
267 Kontorovich, supra note 265, at 1144.  
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undertaken when the increase in the value of production . . . is greater than 
the costs which would be involved in bringing it about.”268  
Once forfeiture is placed into this framework, many of the problems 
with the practice can be understood as either diminishing or increasing 
transaction costs. One critical example is the use of waivers in forfeiture 
cases, which drastically reduce transaction costs for police departments.269 
The Tenaha police department, for instance, forced motorists to sign pre-
notarized waivers, ceding their rights to property.270 This approach drastically 
decreased transaction costs for Tenaha.  
First, the waiver precluded a costly and inconvenient search of property 
to assure that it might be subject to forfeiture. The forfeiture was faster and 
more convenient, avoiding the mental costs of time or inconvenience and 
the empirical cost of paying the searching officer. Second, the waiver was 
pre-notarized, decreasing the inefficiency costs of locating a notary public to 
notarize the document—something that might not be possible should the 
forfeiture occur late at night. Finally, the waiver precluded a later forfeiture 
hearing, another costly redirection of resources for the police department.  
Similarly, the use of dogs in forfeiture actions also decreases the transac-
tion cost of the forfeiture. First, drug dogs alerting to cars can allow a 
search, even without the vehicle owner’s consent, decreasing transaction 
costs by avoiding the inefficiency of obtaining a judicial search warrant.271 
Second, most U.S. currency contains trace amounts of drug material, 
facilitating the seizure of cash with little effort on the part of the officer.272 
Drug-sniffing dogs thus facilitate raising revenue, as they alert to almost any 
drug-tainted currency, and such an alert is often sufficient to establish 
forfeiture. Indeed, cash-strapped police departments are quite explicit about 
their use of dogs as a revenue-raising device: “[Police Chief] Andrews told 
 
268 Coase, supra note 263, at 15.  
269 Indeed, it appears that police departments themselves intrinsically view forfeiture as a 
“profitable” transaction. See, e.g., Dewan supra note 121 (“[O]fficials share tips on maximizing 
profits.”).  
270 See supra notes 156-158 and accompanying text (discussing the use of waivers in asset 
forfeiture cases).  
271 For a more thorough discussion of issues regarding drug-sniffing dogs, warrants, and 
forfeiture, see infra notes 296-309 (discussing the recent Supreme Court decision in Florida v. 
Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1054 (2013), which established a troubling precedent for the use of dogs in 
forfeiture.).  
272 Willie Jones’s story provides one example of the use of dogs to justify otherwise indefen-
sible forfeiture actions. See Jones v. DEA, 819 F. Supp. 698, 720 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (overturning 
the forfeiture of Mr. Jones’s property because it was based on a dog alert; the judge noted the 
problems with such alerts, since almost all U.S. currency is drug tainted). 
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board members that the city is missing out on possible revenues that a K9 
would bring.”273 
A final indication that police try to reduce transaction costs in forfeiture 
is the practice of directing policing efforts toward roads that contain a flow 
of drug buyers, rather than drug sellers.274 This again is an attempt to reduce 
the transaction costs of forfeiture actions. Since police have limited 
resources, they attempt to divert as many of these resources toward maxim-
izing forfeiture revenues, decreasing inefficiency and enforcement costs for 
seizures that will not produce a large return. Other enforcement patterns 
reflect a similar attempt to decrease transaction costs, most notably the 
reverse-sting operation.275  
Recognizing that forfeiture is transactional and that seizing agencies 
strive to reduce transaction costs provides insight into potential solutions, 
especially those involving MVC and LVC. Because these items represent a 
relatively low monetary recovery, any significant increase in transaction 
costs would make seizure of such items economically inefficient.  
2. Externalities 
Applying the transactional paradigm to forfeiture also allows us to 
confront the problem of externalities in MVC and LVC forfeiture. Exter-
nalities are costs or benefits imposed on parties not directly involved in the 
transaction.276 Because externality costs are not factored into the price of 
the market transaction, actors engage in socially suboptimal levels of 
transactions with externalities.277  
Pollution is the classic example: producing many goods imposes significant 
costs—negative externalities—on the environment, which are not factored 
into the price of the goods themselves. Therefore, because the cost of 
pollution is not “priced” into the market, goods are priced too low and thus 
overproduced. This results in generally greater environmental costs, such as 
 
273 Orin Kerr, Town Plans to Raise Revenue by Combining Drug-Sniffing Dogs with Asset Forfei-
ture, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 22, 2012, 11:33 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/08/22/town-
plans-to-raise-revenue-by-combining-drug-sniffing-dogs-with-asset-forfeiture/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/R9DK-PHTE (detailing the plans of Henry, Tennessee to “institute a K9 program 
for the [local] [p]olice [d]epartment”).  
274 See, e.g., supra note 230 and accompanying text.  
275 See id. (describing the perverse incentives that lead to reverse-sting operations).  
276 Thomas Helbling, Externalities: Prices Do Not Capture All Costs, INT’L MONETARY FUND 
(Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/external.htm, archived at 
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the cost of pollution cleanup.278 Here, neoclassical economics sees govern-
ment as the solution, as taxes or other incentive programs can force market 
actors to price their product for the externality, moving the market toward a 
more socially optimal level.279 
An externality analysis is also relevant in the forfeiture context. In all 
cases, police departments attempt to structure forfeiture “transactions” in a 
manner that will increase externalities, pushing costs to other parties so they 
may retain the value of forfeiture entirely for themselves.  
One clear and concrete example of this is police pushback against the 
mandatory grant of attorneys’ fees to victorious claimants in Utah. A prior 
version of a Utah fee-shifting statute provided that “the court shall award a 
prevailing party reasonable attorneys’ fees and other costs of litigation 
reasonably incurred by the owner.”280 By contrast, a newer version of the 
statute, HB384, dramatically changed the statute by changing the mandatory 
“shall” to the permissive “may,” thus giving courts discretion in whether or 
not fees should be awarded.281 HB384 also caps attorneys’ fees at twenty 
percent of the property value.282 This change in the statutory language is 
an attempt by police departments to impose the costs of forfeiture actions as 
“externalities” on non-consenting parties: innocent owners and their 
attorneys. Where once the government had to foot the bill for a wrongful 
forfeiture—an internalized cost, as it was imposed on the party effectuating 
the seizure—the cost is now passed to involuntary parties in the transaction, 
namely the claimant and her legal counsel, who must come up with the 
extensive fees and time necessary to contest forfeiture actions.  
Innocent owner defenses similarly outline the problem of externalities in 
forfeiture actions. The case of Bennis—where Mrs. Bennis lost the entire 
value of her property even though she was a completely innocent claimant—is 
indicative.283 Here, again, the cost of forfeiture was passed on to an 
 
278 Id.  
279 Id.  
280 UTAH CODE ANN. §24-1-11 (2004) (amended by 2013 Utah Laws 1975, 1986); see also 
Radley Balko, Utah Lawmakers Quietly Roll Back Asset Forfeiture Reforms, WASH. POST ( J an. 8, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2014/01/08/utah-lawmakers-quietly-roll-
back-asset-forfeiture-reforms/, archived at http://perma.cc/3ZAA-P38F (discussing the discontinu-
ation of asset forfeiture reforms and its effect on Utah residents); Sibilla, supra note 250. 
281 See UTAH CODE ANN. §24-1-110(1) (2004) (“In any forfeiture proceeding under this 
chapter, the court may award a prevailing party reasonable: (a) legal costs; and (b) attorney fees.”); 
Sibilla, supra note 250.  
282 UTAH CODE ANN. § 24-1-110(2) (amended by 2013 Utah Laws HB384). 
283 Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 453 (1996) (holding that forfeiture was proper consid-
ering Michigan’s objective of deterring illegal activities).  
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involuntary party—the innocent claimant of the property—constituting a 
clear externality. 
Any proposed solution to the forfeiture dilemma thus should force the 
voluntary party to the transaction (in forfeiture, only the seizing agency) to 
internalize its costs so as not to impose burdens on involuntary parties and 
to achieve a more socially optimal level of seizure. 
3. Nudges 
Final insights on this analytical framework emerge from prospect theory 
and behavioral economics, specifically the idea proposed by Thaler and 
Sunstein in Nudge.284 There, the authors propose that the structure of choices 
influences their outcomes.285 As defined by Thaler and Sunstein, a nudge “is 
any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing 
their economic incentives.”286 Significantly, in designing choice architecture, 
the “default” option often is the most selected; thus, the authors propose that 
nudges should be carefully selected to try and maximize social outcomes.287 
Similarly, in the context of forfeitures, procedures should be structured 
to try to minimize the abuse of the practice. Unfortunately, this is not 
currently the case: in many instances, forfeiture procedure is structured to 
make forfeiture the “default” option.  
Again, the use of waivers in forfeiture is indicative of the practice. The 
pre-notarized waivers have removed all procedural barriers to forfeiture; all 
property owners must do is sign the form and leave the police station. Thus, 
forfeiture has become the “default” option. Switching from the default has a 
series of costs for the police department, such as holding the property 
without disposing of it and litigating the forfeiture action.  
Potential forfeiture solutions, then, should include restructuring forfei-
ture procedures to erect barriers to viewing forfeiture as the “default” 
option. Several levels of decision barriers should be erected, with multiple 
decisionmakers, each of whom should agree that the forfeiture is proper. 
Forfeiture should never be the “path of least resistance.”  
Relatedly, because it is often not economically rational to defend MVC 
and LVC against forfeiture,288 this Comment proposes additional procedural 
 
284 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008).  
285 Id. at 6.  
286 Id.  
287 Id. at 6-11.  
288 See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing the costs of forfeiture defenses).  
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burdens that police departments would have to bear before engaging in a 
seizure. The goal of increasing the cost of forfeiture actions is to lower 
levels of MVC and LVC forfeiture, making it no longer cost-efficient for 
officers to seize such low-value property.  
B. Proposed Solutions 
These economic theory insights provide the civil forfeiture reformer 
with several new tools. First, forfeiture procedures should be tailored to 
increase transaction costs, specifically so that it is no longer “profitable” for 
police to pursue MVC and LVC forfeiture. Second, the burdens imposed by 
forfeiture should impact police departments, who should bear the costs 
when they engage in a wrongful seizure. Third, forfeiture procedures should 
be structured to make forfeiture difficult and inconvenient, requiring police 
to actively choose to seize property. Some proposals follow. 
1.  Require an Immediate in Personam Hearing to Determine  
Whether the Seizure is Justified 
This solution would function on all of the axes mentioned above. First, 
it increases transaction costs, because it would require the seizing police 
officer to take the property and its owner to court immediately to justify the 
seizure. Such an inconvenience and hassle to the police officer would not 
justify the seizure of small personal items, and thus many officers might be 
loath to seize a pair of sneakers or petty cash if they know they would have 
to engage in a lengthy court hearing.289 
Moreover, such a solution also works to correct the externality problem 
of forfeiture. The seizing department would be required to bear costs 
directly—by spending time and energy in court—rather than passing them 
off to innocent litigants seeking to contest the forfeiture down the line.  
This solution is also aligned with Thaler and Sunstein’s “nudge” concept. 
Officers would not simply be able to follow forfeiture as a “path of least 
resistance”; seizure would no longer be the default option. Rather, an officer 
would have to justify the seizure in court, which would certainly lead to a 
lower incidence of the practice.  
Finally, this solution is attractive because it addresses one of the major 
problems in forfeiture: that claimants feel entirely disempowered in the 
process. For instance, Jennifer Boatright, who had her property seized in 
Tenaha, expressed her frustration as follows: “Where are we? . . . Is this 
 
289 As noted in the text accompanying supra note 212, LVC and MVC are often petty person-
al property like sneakers, cellphones, or jewelry.  
  
920 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 867 
 
some kind of foreign country, where they’re selling people’s kids off?”290 
Adding an immediate review of the action, and allowing claimants to 
present their stories to an impartial party, would give individuals a sense 
that they, at minimum, were empowered within the process, which is itself a 
positive outcome.  
2. Require Forfeiture Documentation to be Notarized by  
Independent Notaries 
This barrier is similar to the first, but procedural rather than substantive 
in nature. As noted multiple times, police departments use pre-notarized 
forms in forfeiture actions. This practice should not continue. Rather, police 
departments processing documents for forfeiture should be required to send 
those documents to an external notary. The goal is purely to increase 
transaction costs. Sending documents to an external notary is time-
consuming and inefficient. As such, it increases the transaction costs of 
forfeiture and would make the forfeiture of MVC or LVC less attractive.  
Similarly, the additional step of sending documents to an external notary 
works against forfeiture remaining a default option for police departments. 
The inconvenience and added effort of sending documents to an external 
notary would diminish the attractiveness of forfeiture.  
3. Require Extensive Documentation on Any Dogs  
Used in Forfeiture Actions 
Drug-sniffing dogs are becoming increasingly common in forfeiture 
actions, as police departments become ever more aware of their ability to 
generate revenue through forfeiture.291 Indeed, dogs are often an excellent 
investment, requiring a small, upfront cost that consistently returns revenue 
by alerting officers of the presence of drugs on currency.292  
Thus, efforts should be made to increase the “expense” of dogs in forfei-
ture actions. One important factor is maintaining extensive documentation 
on the accuracy of dogs in the field. Such data is obviously normatively 
relevant to forfeiture actions, and claimants should be able to access this 
information in proceedings challenging whether the forfeiture was in fact 
justified. Unreliable dogs should create a degree of doubt in the court, 
which could potentially reverse the seizure. 
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Within the suggested framework, the required paperwork on dogs would 
greatly increase the transaction costs of forfeiture. An officer’s use of a dog 
would require extensive documentation, monitoring, and follow-up, necessi-
tating paperwork and attention to detail. Officers could not use dogs 
indiscriminately to seize currency but rather would be expected to maintain 
and vouch for the accuracy of their dogs’ alerts. 
Moreover, requiring documentation on dog accuracy decreases the “inertia” 
of forfeiture. Police would need to assess the accuracy of the dog at every 
step, demanding conscious engagement throughout the forfeiture process. 
Such an approach is at odds with intellectual inertia and would render 
pursuing MVC and LVC forfeiture much less attractive.  
4. Disallow the “Alert” of Drugs on Currency to  
Justify Forfeiture 
Studies report that over ninety percent of currency in the United States 
is contaminated with trace amounts of cocaine.293 As such, one easy path to 
forfeiture—particularly with petty cash—is to permit a dog to alert on drug-
tainted cash, justifying the seizure. Indeed, this was the approach followed 
in the case of Mr. Willie Jones: after dogs alerted on his cash, authorities 
seized almost $9600 from him.294  
Scientific studies—such as those previously mentioned—should now 
disqualify the drug alert on currency from being considered “probable 
cause” for a forfeiture action. Since over ninety percent of U.S. currency is 
contaminated, a drug alert on cash is simply not indicative that the money is 
in any way related to illegal activity.295 
Such an approach would increase the transaction costs of forfeiture by 
requiring officers to come up with other, more expensive measures to justify 
seizures. Indeed, dog alerts have frequently been cited as a “cost-effective” 
way to engage in forfeiture actions for revenue purposes.296 Disallowing the 
alert on tainted cash would require police to dig deeper into the nature of 
the offense, demanding greater effort on their part. These inconvenience 
costs would decrease the rate at which petty cash would be forfeited.  
 
293 See, e.g., Madison Park, 90 Percent of U.S. Bills Carry Traces of Cocaine, CNN (Aug. 17, 
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295 Park, supra note 293.  
296 Kerr, supra note 273.  
  
922 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 867 
 
5. Require One Hundred Percent of Attorneys’ Fees to  
Be Returned to Successful Claimants 
The mandated attorneys’ fees grant, an idea which several state legisla-
tures have considered, is an attempt to internalize an externality of forfei-
ture: the cost of the proceeding. As mentioned, it is often not economically 
viable to contest the seizure of MVC or LVC, which is worth less than the 
average value of an attorney’s retainer. 
The grant of attorneys’ fees, however, confronts the seizing agency with 
the real possibility that they would be compelled to pay a victorious claimant’s 
fees. As such, agencies would be forced to realize and account for the 
increased costs of these awards. In the language of economic analysis, they 
would be required to internalize the imposed externality of costly legal 
action. This approach would lead to a lower level of forfeiture across the 
board, as agencies would be more cautious about seizing property if they 
knew of the potential for a monetary award against them.  
Moreover, such a change would also decrease the use of forfeiture as a 
default option. As discussed above, many forfeiture actions are simply not 
contested.297 Thus, forfeiture—for seizing agencies—is relatively easy, as 
they can be secure in their belief that the seizure will never be challenged 
before a judge. If these agencies, however, were to know of an increased 
probability that they would be called to account for their actions, forfeiture 
would become much less psychologically attractive.  
6. Require Officers Who Would Engage in  
Seizure to Obtain Certification  
To increase transaction costs of forfeiture for officers, legislatures should 
require officers who wish to seize property to become licensed beforehand. 
Such a licensing requirement should not be superficial. Rather, officers 
should undergo extensive training in forfeiture, studying the justifications 
of forfeiture and the potential hardships it can impose on those who lose 
their property.298 Such training could also be practical, teaching the proper 
bases for forfeiture or different techniques to effect forfeiture. Moreover, 
such training should have to be renewed, biannually or at some sufficiently 
 
297 See supra note 106 (noting that eighty percent of forfeiture actions are uncontested).  
298 Such training is routine in other contexts. For instance, to use drug dogs, officers in Flor-
ida are required to undergo over 280 hours of training. See Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1054 
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regular date to both impose a cost on the officer and department and to 
keep the real damage of forfeiture prevalent in the officers’ minds. 
This proposal would burden forfeiture actions on multiple axes. First, it 
would increase transaction costs of civil forfeiture. Departments or officers 
would have to pay to certify their officers to engage in forfeitures, a signifi-
cant monetary investment to maintain the program. Moreover, in individual 
forfeiture actions, if an unlicensed officer would wish to seize property, he 
would have to radio for backup and get a certified officer present. Such a 
time investment would not merit the seizure of MVC or LVC and might 
justify leaving such property alone. 
Furthermore, training would act as a “nudge” against forfeiture. By 
actively educating seizing officers, the training would reduce the subcon-
scious attractiveness of forfeiture actions, particularly if officers were aware 
of the havoc forfeiture could wreak on claimants’ lives. Requiring frequent 
training is important to keep this knowledge fresh in officers’ minds.  
C. Progress?  
Unfortunately, progress on these fronts has been muted. Courts and 
legislatures have actually gone in the opposite direction, at times reducing 
transaction costs, allowing police departments to pursue forfeiture more 
easily. Indeed, a recent New York Times article indicates that police 
departments across the United States are actually increasing their forfeiture 
programs, in spite of public outcry.299 
Specifically with regards to drug-sniffing dogs, a recent Supreme Court 
decision took the matter in entirely the wrong direction. In Florida v. 
Harris, appellant Harris attempted to suppress evidence obtained from a 
dog alert on his truck.300 Florida’s Supreme Court allowed the suppression 
of evidence, finding a dog’s reliability directly relevant to establishing the 
probable cause necessary for a search.301 
The Supreme Court, however, overturned the state court’s determina-
tion. The Court found field data of dog alerts to be unreliable because it 
may potentially fail to capture false negatives or may provide a seemingly 
false positive if drugs were too well-concealed to be revealed in a search.302 
Much more important to the Court was the dog’s performance in training: 
“If a bona fide organization has certified a dog after testing his reliability in 
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a controlled setting, a court can presume . . . the dog’s alert provides 
probable cause to search.”303 
The Court’s reasoning proves problematic in the forfeiture context for 
two reasons. First, establishing a presumption in favor of a dog’s accuracy as 
a basis for probable cause establishes a dangerous precedent in forfeiture 
actions, where probable cause is often the necessary standard for seizure.304 
If trained dogs are presumed to be accurate for probable cause purposes,305 
then their accuracy would be practically unassailable if a seizure were to 
proceed based on a dog’s alert.  
More troubling, however, is the Court’s parsing of police motives. The 
Court held that the police dogs should generally be trusted because “only 
accurate drug-detection dogs enable officers to locate contraband without 
incurring unnecessary risks or wasting limited time and resources.”306 
However, this is patently not true in the forfeiture context. Instead, it 
would advantage police departments to obtain wildly inaccurate dogs that 
would constantly alert, thus justifying the seizure of property. Police have 
no incentive to ensure the accuracy of their dogs, as they would in a search 
context where officers must invest time with an uncertain pay-off.307 This 
decision has in fact alarmed forfeiture watchdog groups, like the Americans 
for Forfeiture Reform, which, in its commentary on the decision, called the 
case “very bad news for anyone concerned with civil asset forfeiture reform 
and anyone worried about how these laws corrupt law enforcement and/or 
prey on the poor.”308 
Progress on other fronts has been similarly troubling. Utah’s legislature 
recently eviscerated an effective attorneys’ fee program, which required 
one hundred percent of attorneys’ fees to go to successful claimants.309 
Additionally, the Tennessee legislature rewrote a bill that would have 
required immediate in personam forfeiture hearings.310 
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These are undoubtedly troubling—if expected—setbacks. Law enforce-
ment politics and a powerful lobby mean that any reform to forfeiture will 
be politically difficult.311 Properly framed, however, these suggested reforms 
would hopefully be more successful than proposals for a wholesale abolition 
of the practice. Intelligent legislators could frame the issue to the public as 
an attempt to provide procedural safeguards for individuals’ private property 
rights. Rather than attacking police, these measures could be framed as 
ensuring fairness to potential innocent persons in the community.  
Additional cause for optimism comes from the fact that attitudes on the 
drug war seem to be shifting, particularly with regards to marijuana.312 As 
states increasingly legalize marijuana, and once-shunned drugs become 
more normalized, the pressing need for forfeiture to enforce drug laws will 
wane. Moreover, the number of forfeiture actions initiated will likely drop, as 
many are premised on the “smell” of marijuana313 in a vehicle, a contention 
that is impossible to disprove, since marijuana is burned in consumption, and 
smells do not linger.  
Thus, overall, forfeiture reformers should attempt to understand very 
specifically what they are targeting. Although broad, sweeping forfeiture 
reforms are important, they may be politically infeasible or may too broadly 
outlaw forfeiture actions that are valuable. By contrast, measures narrowly 
targeted at protecting MVC and LVC—often individual’s personal, private 
property—would go a long way toward curbing abuse of the practice.  
CONCLUSION 
Any optimism for reform must necessarily be cautious. Forfeiture is like 
the mythic hydra—successfully severing one “head” merely encourages 
another to grow. However, the recent popular outcry over the practice 
means that legislatures may soon feel pressure from constituencies to 
pursue more meaningful reform.  
Legislatures that embark on the project of reforming forfeiture must do 
so with very clear goals in mind. This Comment proposes approaching 
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forfeiture as a “transaction”—one in which costs, externalities, and psychic 
biases play an important role.  
While legislatures have thus far given seizing agencies unlimited upside 
by allowing them to recoup profits or property seized, they have not 
imposed any concomitant costs on these agencies. As such, forfeiture levels 
have spiraled dramatically out of control. The goal then should be to impose 
proper levels of transaction costs and to require seizing agencies to internalize 
the externalities they would impose on claimants.  
Properly regulating the “market” of forfeiture would necessarily result in 
a reduction in the most pernicious area of forfeiture abuse: MVC and LVC 
forfeiture. Because these items are of such low value, any increase in the 
costs of forfeiture would make such items economically unappealing to 
seizing agencies. Adjusting this incentive structure ex ante is key because 
these items are simply not valuable enough to merit an ex post defense in 
convoluted forfeiture actions. Most laypeople—and even attorneys without 
a sophisticated knowledge of forfeiture—simply find it more cost-effective 
to let seized property go than to challenge the action. As such, any system 
must work to prevent such property from being seized in the first place.  
This Comment makes no claims of determining the exact “value” of 
costs that would be required to successfully regulate such forfeiture. Indeed, 
many of these costs are not economically explicit but relate more to psychic 
costs individual officers bear: inconvenience, repetition, and other “irritating” 
activities that would lead officers to simply decide a seizure was not worth 
the effort.  
This Comment’s contribution is its theoretical framework. If legislatures 
were to concentrate on increasing the upfront costs to seizing agencies, they 
would inevitably alter police incentives. These new incentive structures 
would hopefully keep the property of law-abiding people safe from seizure.  
 
